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The  paper  offers  a  contribution  to  the  understanding  of  the  relations  between 
incentives, satisfaction and performance of employees in social enterprises. It starts 
by criticizing the general hypotheses of the principal-agent theory and especially that 
employee satisfaction is determined exclusively by the level of salary received. These 
criticisms  are  explained  both  by  looking  to  the  organizational  definition  of  job 
satisfaction  by  Locke  and  by  taking  a  behavioural  economics  perspective.  Job 
satisfaction is thus assumed to derive from a composed mix of incentives received on 
the  job,  equity  perceived  and  employee  motivations.  It  is  no  longer  possible  to 
assume that the wage is the sole (not even the most important) variable influencing 
worker performance. This claim is especially valid in social enterprises, where worker 
performance is difficult to monitor and evaluate, while high intrinsic motivations can 
better explain job satisfaction. 
 
The empirical analysis helps to shed light on the determinants of job satisfaction and 
individual performance. Data was collected on 4,134 employees working in 320 Italian 
social cooperatives. The paper introduces the methodologies of categorical principal 
components analysis, factor analysis, and Rasch models to group the items of intrinsic 
and extrinsic satisfaction, motivations and fairness. The data was then analysed by 
means  of  linear  regression  where  the  dependent  variables  are  not  only  the  stated 
degree of job satisfaction, but also satisfaction with extrinsic and intrinsic aspects of 
the  job.  The  models  come  to  demonstrate  the  particular  relevance  of  employee 
motivations  and  fairness  perceived  in  explaining  job  satisfaction  and  its  sub-
dimensions. Furthermore, organizational  perceptions and the work environment are 
found  to  be  significant  as  are  individual  perceptions  and  motivations.
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In mainstream economics, the employment relationship was mainly conceived as an 
exchange  of  wage  for  time  and  effort,  since  the  worker  is  supposed  to  only  pay 
attention to the contracted labour services he/she is delivering to the firm. A similar 
approach  has  been  followed  by  institutional  economists  (starting  with  the 
contributions of Arrow, 1971; Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Holmstrom, 1979; Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Hart & Holmstrom, 1987), who have formalised a model of exchange 
between the principal and the agent. The model assumes that the principal has as her 
only objective the maximization of her profit, while the agent maximizes her utility. 
Given  these  aims,  agency  theory  focuses,  firstly,  on  the  process  of  screening  of 
workers, and secondly on the design of the efficient contract, that is the contract able 
to guide appropriate actions by the agent. In the selection process, the principal must 
design  the  wage  structure  able  to  maximize  the  organizational  outcome  under  the 
participation and the incentive constraint of the worker. As theory suggests, workers 
will  accept  the  job  if,  and  only  if,  the  achieved  utility  is  at  least  as  high  as  their 
reserve  utility  and,  simultaneously,  the  possible  utility  achieved in outside  options. 
The only incentive entering in the workers‘ utility function is the wage, while the cost 
of effort is negatively correlated with it.  
 
The wage is the central focus of the incentive scheme, which aims at inducing workers 
to  exert  the  optimal  effort  level.  Most  attention  was  devoted  therefore  to  pay-for-
performance,  deferred  compensation  and  team  production  (for  a  comprehensive 
review,  see  Prendergast,  1999).  Nevertheless,  the  main  inefficiencies  in  these 
contractual schemes are linked to the costs of contracting (starting from Coase, 1937; 
Williamson,  1985,  1996)  and  incompleteness  (starting  from  Grossman  and  Hart, 
1986; Hart and Moore, 1982). The main obstacles to the achievement of first-best 
contracts emerge especially in multi-tasking activities, where employee performance 
consists of both quantitative and qualitative activities. 
 
Since economic incentives can fail to gain the maximum possible degree of worker 
commitment, the emergence of a new economic approach to workers‘ preferences has 
progressively developed. It demonstrates that worker involvement can be increased 
also through non-monetary incentives. Behavioural economists have reflected on the 
multifaceted nature of employment relationships and on the importance of incentives 
other  than  wage  to  increase  workers‘  satisfaction  and  effort.  Job  satisfaction  is 
therefore today conceived as a complex mental process, in which employees evaluate 
different  aspects  of  their  jobs  and  in  which  they  have  preferences  expressed  by 
individual motivations and needs. Furthermore, job satisfaction is no more conceived 
as a constraint to the organizational management, but it becomes a specific objective 
of  human  resource  management  policies,  especially  in  jobs  where  employee 
commitment is crucial to organizational outcomes, for example when labour contracts 
are highly incomplete due to asymmetric information and to the relational content of 
the delivered services.  
 
Simultaneously, the contribution of the worker can be measured not only in terms of 
working time, technical abilities and productivity, but depends also on cognitive and 
psychological  involvement,  since  workers  consume  both  physical  and  psychological 
energy.  Higher  effort  levels  are  therefore  not  always  sufficiently  compensated  with 
monetary incentives, but they can be enhanced also thanks to altruistic motivations 
and non-monetary incentives.  4 
 
 
More  attention  must  be  given  to  this  multifaceted  nature  of  the  determinants  of 
employee satisfaction and performance. In particular, the paper briefly reviews the 
theoretical approaches that have considered the main components of job satisfaction 
and of workers‘ behaviour, and it proposes a survey of some of the main results found 
in  the  literature.  By  combining  theory  and  empirical  results,  section  one  depicts  a 
comprehensive mental process of construction of job satisfaction and summarises the 
main determinants of job satisfaction. A simple model is proposed that is tested in 
section two. 
 
The paper then turns its attention to social enterprises: private nonprofit organizations 
with a productive aim. Nonprofit organizations  in general, and social enterprises in 
particular,  are  understood  as  organizations  in  which  workers‘  motivations  and 
satisfaction  include  intrinsic  and  non-self  regarding  nature  components  (Rose-
Ackerman, 1996; Young, 1983). Furthermore, social enterprises seem to provide their 
workers a specific mix of incentives, conceived as extrinsic non-wage incentives (e.g., 
training,  a  positive  work  environment,  career,  etc.)  and  intrinsic  resources  (e.g., 
involvement,  self-esteem,  social  recognition,  social  usefulness,  etc.)  (Borzaga  and 
Depedri,  2008).  The  paper  tests  the  determinants  of  job  satisfaction  using  data 
collected  in  a  recent  investigation  concerning  4,134  workers  in  320  Italian  social 
enterprises and reflects on them and draws conclusions. The data was analysed by 
means of linear regression where the dependent variable is the stated degree of job 
satisfaction, which in the survey was decomposed into 25 different aspects of the job 
and of the working environment. Three synthetic representations of job satisfaction 
are produced, total job satisfaction and satisfaction with extrinsic and intrinsic aspects 
of the job.  Continuous variables  employed  in  linear  estimation have  been  obtained 
from demand items by means of the Rasch model. The original items concerning job 
satisfaction,  workers‘  motivations,  procedural  and  distributive  fairness  have  been 
grouped by employing categorical principal components analysis and factor analysis. 
The linearised model encloses also intrinsic and extrinsic rewards, which have been 
added to complete the picture of the features of the incentive mix both in monetary 
and non-monetary terms. The model is intended to give a comprehensive picture of 
the  determinants  of  job  satisfaction  also  because  it  allows  the  comparison  of  the 
impact of different determinants. We also added the OLS estimates concerning overall 
job satisfaction and wage satisfaction as a term of comparison for the estimates that 
concern the variables obtained with the Rasch model. 
 
Section 1 deals with the theoretical model of job satisfaction, worker motivations, and 
the  organizational  context  that  rests  in  the  background  of  our  empirical  analysis. 
Section 2 presents the descriptive analysis of the data. The main statistics of workers‘ 
socio-demographic  features,  motivational  drives,  satisfaction,  contextual  variables, 
and  fairness  are  displayed  and  discussed.  Section  3  introduces  the  econometric 
analysis of the factors influencing worker on-the-job well-being. Section 4 concludes 
with some discussion about the relations between the econometric findings and the 
theoretical premises in Section 1.  
 
1. The mental process of construction of job satisfaction 
 
The estimation of job satisfaction is a compound mental process, which starts from 
the evaluation of one‘s own expectations on the ideal job and ends with the general 
well-being  of  the  employee.  It  includes  both  physical  and  psychological  factors;  it 5 
 
requires the employee to consider all the characteristics of the job and therefore it can 
be determined by many factors. These possible determinants of job satisfaction have 
therefore been included by scholars in both theoretical and empirical analyses. The 
contribution  of  the  empirical  literature  is  crucial,  but  puzzling  in  many  respects. 
Researchers  have  in  fact  generally  dedicated  their  attention  to  only  some 
determinants  at  a  time,  given  the  difficulty  both  in  designing  appropriate 
questionnaires including the most relevant explanatory factors of job satisfaction and 
in  carrying  out  models  including  proxies  for  many  aspects  of  the  job  and 
characteristics of the worker.  
 
The various determinants of job satisfaction can be however summarised by exploiting 
the  study  by  Locke  (1969,  1976)  and  by  integrating  his  approach  with  notions  of 
behavioural theory and results of empirical analyses.  
 
1.1. The determinants 
 
In  order  to  sort  out  the  main  determinants  of  job  satisfaction,  it  is  essential  to 
describe  employees‘  understanding  of  their  job  and  of  their  well-being.  As  Locke 
asserts  (1976,  p.1301)  ―[a]  job  is  […]  a  complex  interrelationship  of  tasks,  role, 
responsibilities, interactions, incentives, rewards‖. Therefore, job satisfaction depends 
on the estimation of many dimensions, which are classified in three groups: the work, 
the  context,  and  the  rewards.  The  empirical  literature  investigated  all  these 
dimensions, although more recent approaches have integrated Locke‘s taxonomy with 
new and more precise terminologies, which lead to a comprehensive description of the 
determinants of job satisfaction. 
 
The first set of determinants of job satisfaction goes therefore under the unifying label 
of work. Work describes all the main features of the job. It approximates the manner 
in which the job is carried out and thus it includes variables such as task activities, 
professional training, control, achievement, variety, and intrinsic interest for the job. 
This  job  dimension  has  been  greatly  considered  in  empirical  analyses,  which  have 
mainly  concentrated  on  its  intrinsic  components.  Empirical  investigations  have 
generally concluded that intrinsic aspects of work positively influence job satisfaction. 
For example, an interesting job is considered by workers to be the greatest positive 
determinant of job satisfaction (Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza 2000; Skalli et al. 2007), 
or one of the most important job characteristics (Clark, 2005; Helliwell and Huang, 
2005). Similarly ―good job contents‖ (described as having an interesting job, useful 
for  helping  other  people  and  society,  which  is  thought  to  enhance  worker 
independence) influence job satisfaction significantly and positively (Clark, 2005) and 
workers (especially managers) appear frequently committed more to their jobs than 
to  their  organizations  (Stroh  et  al.  1994).  Also  autonomy  and  self-determination 
positively impact on job satisfaction (Hechanova et al. 2006) and the same is true for 
workers‘ participation in managerial review processes (e.g. Dipboye, 1985; Nathan et 
al., 1991; Soonhee, 2002). 
 
The  second  group  of  determinants  of  job  satisfaction  considered  by  Locke  is  the 
context, which refers to physical and social working conditions. This group of variables 
has not been studied in depth by researchers, although some authors have evidenced 
the significance of some features of the context such as, in particular, the working 
hours and the physical work environment (Clark, 1997; Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza, 
2000; Gazioglu and Tansel, 2006; Skalli et al., 2007). Among other proxies of the 6 
 
working environment, employee satisfaction appears to be negatively influenced by 
firm size, as in Clark (1997), and it varies by sector of activity and organizational form 
(as shown by Diaz-Serrano and Cabral Vieira 2005; Ghinetti 2007). However, some 
analyses  demonstrate  that  satisfaction  is  only  indirectly  determined  by  the  size  of 
organizations, since size determines a different atmosphere and different processes of 
workplace learning (e.g. Rowden, 2002). Similarly, the sector and the legal form are 
non significant when the characteristics of the working environment and of workers 
are taken into account (as in Borzaga and Depedri, 2005; Tortia, 2008; Lanfranchi 
and Narcy, 2008). 
 
The  notion  of  context  can  however  be  extended  also  over  elements  of  physical 
working conditions and specifically to social conditions. The context refers also to the 
interaction  among  employees  and  therefore  relationships  must  be  included  as  a 
relevant  proxy  of  the  context.  Empirical  analysis  have  in  this  case  amply 
demonstrated that employees‘ relatedness with supervisors, colleagues and customers 
increases  job  satisfaction  (Clark  1997;  Borzaga  and  Depedri  2005;  Borzaga  and 
Depedri 2009). More specifically, the relationship with management seems even more 
important  than  relationships  with  colleagues  (Sousa-Poza  and  Sousa-Poza  2000; 
Helliwell and Huang, 2005), and in general relationships may be conceived as a good 
that firms can in some cases exchange for monetary compensation (as demonstrated 
by Antonioli et al. 2008, Borzaga and Depedri 2005, when comparing non-profit with 
for-profit firms).  
 
The  last  important  group  of  variables  explaining  job  satisfaction  includes  rewards. 
Rewards  consist of all  the  economic  benefits  supplied by  the  organization,  as  pay, 
promotion,  and  other  benefits,  but also  verbal  recognition and  responsibilities. The 
most  studied reward  is  wage,  although results of the  empirical  literature  are  quite 
puzzling.  On  the  one  hand,  workers‘  compensation  and  job  satisfaction  seem 
positively related in country cross-section analysis (Skalli et al. 2007; Sousa-Poza and 
Sousa-Poza  2000;  Blanchflower and  Oswald,  1999)  and  this  result  is  confirmed by 
some studies on the correlation between wage and job satisfaction (Siebern-Thomas‘s 
2005; Brown and McIntosh 1998; Diaz-Serrano and Cabral Vieira 2005). Other studies 
have  however  revealed  that  the  relationship  between  the  wage  level  and  job 
satisfaction  can  also  be  negative  (Leontaridi  and  Sloane,  2001)  or  it  is  frequently 
weak or undetermined (Cappelli and Sherer 1988). Furthermore, in sectors of activity 
where the relevance of other characteristics of the work and of the context is more 
important (as in the social services sector) and when controlling for the contextual 
variables  (on-the-job  relationships  in  Borzaga  and  Depedri  2005;  procedural  and 
distributive fairness in Tortia 2008) the wage does not influence job satisfaction. 
 
A  stronger  correlation  emerges  instead  between  job  satisfaction  and  some  sub-
dimensions of the wage (as defined by Locke). Empirical analyses have demonstrated 
that not only, or even mainly, does the absolute level of pay, but also the presence of 
bonuses  and  of  overtime  policies,  pay  equity  and  pay  security  have  important 
consequence  on  job  satisfaction.  First,  the  effect  of  economic  rewards  on  job 
satisfaction  is  positive  and  significant  when  organizations  implement  policies  of 
budgetary participation and budgetary emphasis (Lau and Tan 2003). Second, when 
the effective wage is under the expected level workers are less satisfied with their job 
(Cappelli and Sherer, 1988). Similarly, the differences in wages among co-workers, 7 
 
which  is  an  index  of  distributive  fairness,
1  negatively affect job satisfaction (Benz 
2005).  
 
As  regards  other  possible  economic  rewards,  empirical  analysis  demonstrated  that 
both changes in workers‘ pay over time (Clark, 1999) and promotion opportunities 
(Clark, 1997) positively  influence job satisfaction. The importance of non-monetary 
rewards has been instead investigated mainly by introducing psychological factors as 
in the contribution of behavioural theory. Both the theory and empirical analyses show 
that  people  are  moved  by  incentives  other  than  the  wage,  as  for  example  social 
approval (Gaechter and Falk, 2000), fairness, and other non-monetary aspects of the 
job.  
 
1.2. The process  
 
Understanding the characteristics of the job that impact on employee satisfaction is 
not sufficient to predict the level of job satisfaction. As asserted by Locke in another 
passage of his contribution (p. 1307) ―[j]ob satisfaction results from the perception 
that one‘s job fulfils or allows the fulfilment of one‘s important values, providing to the 
degree that those values are congruent with one‘s needs‖. The work, the context and 
the  rewards  are  therefore  only  proxies  for  the  essence  of  the  job,  while  job 
satisfaction  emerges  from  the  comparison  between  the  job  and  employees‘ 
expectations and needs. Moreover, each job characteristic is not equally assigned the 
same value by all people, since different employees can have different preferences.  
 
As  regards  expectancies  concerning  the  job,  employees  evaluate  ex-ante  what  the 
working  environment  can  offer  them  considering  their  personal  traits  and  abilities. 
Empirical studies on job satisfaction have only rarely estimated workers‘ expectations. 
Mainly, expectations have been approximated by the natural traits and professional 
characteristics  of  workers.  It  is  thus  assumed  that  individual  expectations  mainly 
depend  on  the  characteristics  of  employees  and  on  the  tendency  of  homogeneous 
classes of people to adopt homogeneous preferences and expectations. For example, 
women and men differ in their expectations and this is why job satisfaction tends to 
be  higher  for  women  (Clark,  1997;  Long,  2005).  However,  the  female  satisfaction 
premium is reported to have decreased in the last years due to the convergence of 
expectations  between  men  and  women.    (Sousa-Poza  and  Sousa-Poza,  2003). 
Similarly, the higher satisfaction of workers with lower levels of education is explained 
by  higher  expectations  of  highly-educated  people  and  in  particular  by  educational 
surpluses (Tsang et.al, 1991; Hersch, 1991; Gazioglu and Tansel, 2006). Also, age is 
correlated  with  job  satisfaction,  but  in  a  U-shaped  way,  and  so  employees‘ 
expectations seem to be lower when they enter the labour market and to follow a 
process of adaptation in the long run. 
 
Looking instead at needs, they include both economic needs and other physical and 
psychological needs. The pyramid of needs designed by Maslow (1974) identifies five 
categories: physiological needs (or prime needs), needs of security (included stability, 
and  protection),  needs  of  identification  and  involvement  (both  in  a  society,  and  in 
                                                 
1   Distributive fairness is the perception of correctness of the level of the wage earned in comparison to 
different aspects of the job (e.g. stress, role) and individual status (e.g. level of education) or a benchmark (e.g. 
the market wage or other colleagues’ wages), while procedural fairness refers to the correctness of organizational 
procedures, the transparency in the transmission of information, and the equity in managing careers. 8 
 
groups),  needs  of  esteem  (as  self-esteem  and  other  rewards),  and  needs  of  self-
fulfilment (as implementation of personal and professional abilities). These categories 
include therefore mental health and mental pleasures beyond physiological needs and 
the consumption of goods. Furthermore, needs quite well identify the various aspects 
of  a  job  that  are  evaluated  by  employees  and  that  have  been  described  in  the 
previous  paragraph.  It  seems  therefore  possible  to assert that employees  evaluate 
their needs on the different features that a job should supply and compare them with 
the characteristics of their own jobs. 
 
As a last point in the definition of job satisfaction by Locke, employees judge their job 
through individual values. Employees know what they want and value (contents) and 
how much they want and value (intensity). They express individual preferences for 
each aspect of their job and therefore their evaluation of job satisfaction can differ 
even if the job has exactly the same characteristics (in terms of work, context and 
rewards) and employees have the same personal traits and needs.  
 
The notion of values is the most complex to define. However, starting from the ‗80s, 
writings  in  behavioural  theory  have  stressed  the  presence  of  people  with 
heterogeneous preferences in terms of values assigned to both monetary and non-
monetary  rewards  and  preferences.  A  better  understanding  of  employees‘  values 
comes  from  the  notions  of  motivations,  social  preferences,  and  non  self-regarding 
preferences.  
 
Initially  introduced  by  psychologists,  the  term  motivation  defines  all  factors 
influencing  people‘s  actions  and  in  particular  the  level  of  energy  that  individuals 
devote to their choices.
2 The main distinction in (both economic and psycholo gical) 
literature,  is  between  extrinsic  and  intrinsic  motivations  (deCharms,  1968;  Deci, 
1975; Frey, 1997; Benabou and Tirole, 2003). Extrinsic motivations emerge when 
workers satisfy their needs indirectly, mainly through monetary compensation and 
buying goods or services. Intrinsic motivations are fulfilled when workers undertake 
an  activity  for  their  immediate  satisfaction.  Consequently,  the  intrinsic  nature  is 
specific to the task and directed to: the flow of activity, a goal that is self-defined, and 
the obligation of personal and social norms—benevolence, identity, fairness—for their 
own  sake  (Frey,  1997).  Intrinsic  motivations  include  the  interest  in  the  activity 
performed,  good  relationships  with  other  colleagues  and  with  superiors,  and 
involvement and autonomy in decision-making at the operational and strategic level. 
These  aspects  are  conclusively  linked  to  work  as  defined  by  Locke.  Furthermore, 
intrinsic motivations are more strictly related to the satisfaction of higher needs, like 
self-esteem and self-fulfilment in Maslow‘s scale, hence their fulfilment comes after 
the satisfaction of more basic needs, which are linked to monetary rewards. The term 
motivation  seems  therefore  complementary  to  the  theory  by  Locke.  A  job 
encompasses  both  extrinsic  and  intrinsic  needs,  workers  have  both  extrinsic  and 
intrinsic  expectations,  and  people  assign  different  intensity  to  their  intrinsic  and 
extrinsic values.
3  
                                                 
2   Therefore, the term reproduces the general assumption that behaviours depend upon perceptions and 
thinking, which are transformed into effort to achieve goals and satisfy needs (Atkinsons, 1973; Fontana, 1989). 
3   Whether motivations refer more to the dimension of values than to workers’ expectations is however a 
little unclear. For example, Benabou and Tirole (2000) assume that extrinsic motivations consist of contingent 
rewards,  while intrinsic motivations are individual’s  desires. Extrinsic aspects seem therefore  quantitatively 
measured and come from the direct provision of the principal. Intrinsic aspects are instead psychological factors 
proper of the worker and help in defining workers’ values. 9 
 
 
The intensity of values also depends on the preference of employees for aspects other 
than  the  self-sphere.  Experimental  studies  have  offered  the  main  contribution  to 
understand  social  preferences.  For  a  clear  understanding  of  the  specificities  of  the 
various  types  of  social  preferences,  the  taxonomy  reported  in  Fehr  and  Schmidt 
(2001) is useful. The authors firstly claim that social preferences in general emerge 
when  the  utility  of  an  individual  is  affected  by  variations  in  the  allocation  of  the 
physical  resources  of  other  people.  In  other  words,  the  decision-maker  takes  into 
consideration  not  only  her  personal  payoff,  but  also  how  material  resources  are 
allocated  to  others.  Depending  on  the  impact  of  the  others‘  situation  on  the 
individual‘s well-being, social preferences are then subdivided in pure altruism—when 
the individual always values positively material resources allocated to other people—
inequity  aversion—when  differences  in  the  payoff  or  in  the  well-being  of  others 
decrease  the  well-being  of  the  individual—and  reciprocity—when  an  individual 
responds kindly to kind actions and with hostility to nasty actions. The focus of this 
approach is to evidence the dependence of individual well-being on aspects other than 
the  self  and  in  particular  from  the  well-being  of  others.  Applied  to  employees,  it 
means that job satisfaction not only depends on the individual position in the work but 
also  on  the  well-being  of  others  in  the  organizations:  for  example  colleagues,  the 
principal  and  clients.  The  importance  of  social  preferences  has  been  investigated 
especially within nonprofit organizations or in sectors of general interest. For example, 
social  preferences  seem  to  explain  why  nonprofit  organizations  are  able  to  select 
altruistic employees willing to donate part of their work (Preston, 1989) and inclined 
to  develop  a  sense  of  group  connected  with  the  social  dimension  of  the  activity 
(Almond  and  Kendall,  2002).  Related  to  this,  equity  has  been  probably  the  most 
studied among the other social preferences, by looking to the distribution of wages 
among  co-workers,  but  also  by  considering  the  organizational  procedures  that 
influence  the  distribution  of  well-being.  Empirical  analyses  on  job satisfaction  have 
come  thus  to evidence  that individual  job satisfaction depends  on both  distributive 
(Levine,  1991;  Mirvis,  1992;  Leete,  2000)  and  procedural  fairness  (Benz,  2005; 
Tortia, 2008). 
 
This multifaceted nature of preferences has been enquired by other authors and in 
particular by Ben-Ner and Putterman (1998). According to their approach, individuals 
are  simultaneously  motivated  by  self-regarding  egotistical  motivations,  other-
regarding  social  preferences,  and  process-regarding  motivations  linked  to  how  an 
organization  manages  its  human  resources.  This  taxonomy  summarizes  previous 
considerations  on  the  origins  of  values  by  distinguishing  among  aspects  which  are 
supplied for the exclusive benefit of the employee; aspects which involve others, but 
have  an  indirect  impact  on  the  individual;  and  aspects  that  concern  the  working 
environment  and  the  management  of  the  organization  and  therefore  influence  the 
employees‘ perception of being part of the context. Here again, procedural justice is 
evidenced  as  a  crucial  component.  While  complete,  the  taxonomy  can  be  further 
deepened  by  including  in  self-regarding  preferences  both  intrinsic  and  extrinsic 
aspects, as respectively self-fulfilment, on the one hand, and altruism on the other. 
Hence, the interrelation among factors describing job satisfaction is to be added to the 






1.3. The interactions  
 
In the supply of rewards and in the management of incentives to increase employee 
satisfaction, some incentives (or job characteristics) frequently interrelate with others 
and  therefore  their  final  impact  on  job  satisfaction  is  undetermined.  The  main 
interference between variables has been explained by the psychological perceptions of 
employees.  This  effect  has  been  mentioned  in  the  behavioural  literature  as  the 
crowding-out of intrinsic motivations. Its functioning has been empirically proven by 
Frey  and  Jegen  (2000)  and  Deci  and  Ryan  (1985),  explaining  that,  under  specific 
conditions, extrinsic rewards can be perceived by workers as ways of controlling and 
disciplining. 
 
Furthermore,  as  shown  by  Akerlof  and  Kranton  (2004),  in  some  contexts,  wage 
rewards can damage workers‘ self-image as jobholders and their involvement in the 
team  and  organizational  mission.  Benabou  and  Tirole  (2003)  evidence  a  negative 
effect of pay-for-performance on agents‘ perceptions of their own abilities, and then 
on their  performance.  These  results give  important contributions  for understanding 
job satisfaction and advise researchers on the relevance of possible interactions not 
only between rewards, on the one hand, and job satisfaction on the other, but also 
among rewards, with consequences on job satisfaction that may be negative. On the 
other  hand,  profit  sharing  has  been  generally  recognised  to  enhance  worker 
satisfaction and effort, hence it does not seem to crowd out intrinsic motivations (Frey 
and  Osterloh  1999;  Green  and  Heywood  2008),  probably  because  it  concerns  the 
results of the organisation as a whole and not of specific work activities. 
 
Interactions also concern behaviours of employees within an organization. As Manski 
(1995)  observes,  preferences,  perceptions  and  behaviours  of  employees  are 
influenced  by  the  interaction  with  the  working  environment  and  with  similar 
individuals.  Specifically,  ―individuals  belonging  to  the  same  group  tend  to  behave 
similarly‖ due to three main typologies of effects (p.127). First, endogenous effects 
emerge  when  the  individual  behaviour  is  influenced  by  the  prevalence  of  that 
behaviour in the group. Second, contextual effects are identified in the adoption of 
behaviours which are influenced by the distribution of background characteristics in 
the group. Third, correlated effects consist in the emergence of similar behaviours of 
employees in one organization because they face similar institutional environment or 
have  similar  individual  characteristics.  These  statements  can  be  applied  to  explain 
similar  behaviours  of  employees  in  terms  not  only  of  effort  chosen,  but  also  of 
satisfaction achieved. Frequently employees within one organization tend to express 
similar levels of job satisfaction not only because of similar job conditions (rewards, 
the context, the work), but also because their motivations are similar and employees 
influence each other‘s perceptions and attitudes towards the job. The emergence of 
similar  perceptions  and  attitudes  of  workers  within  organizations  has  been  also 
confirmed by studies on the sorting of employees with similar characteristics in the 
same organization or sector (e.g. Mortensen [1984] when looking to employees‘ skills; 
Krueger and Schkade [2007] speaking about propensity for interpersonal relations). 
Therefore,  both  approaches  help  in  claiming  that  the  working  environment 
simultaneously  tends  to  select  people  with  similar  characteristics  and  to  motivate 
employees towards similar behaviours and perceptions due to the prevalence of those 
characteristics and behaviours in the group.  
 11 
 
An adaptation process seems to emerge, which can be also described from norms of 
conformism or from evolutionary preferences. Interrelations among people and with 
the  working  environment  promote  in  fact  the  evolution  of  preferences  and  the 
adaptation of behaviours over time.  
 
1.4. The model to test 
 
The picture describing job satisfaction is now complete while complex (Figure 1). Job 
satisfaction  is  the  result  of  a  process  that  starts  from  the  identification  of  the 
individual, whose natural traits explain her needs and expectations towards the job. 
Furthermore, the employee expresses values and ideals; he has both self-regarding 
and  other-regarding  preferences,  and  is  moved  by  both  extrinsic  and  intrinsic 
motivations. These can be ranked by following the Maslow hierarchy or the individual 
preferences, starting however from the most basic needs, which are fulfilled mainly by 
monetary and extrinsic rewards, and going up to higher-level needs, which are best 
supported by the intrinsic interest in the job, by involvement, and by other relational 
and procedural components of the working environment. 
 




After  his  hiring,  the  employee  obtains  rewards  and  non-monetary  incentives  and 
evaluates  her  job  characteristics  by  looking  to  both  extrinsic  and  intrinsic 
characteristics.  Furthermore,  he  learns  from  interacting  with  the  working 
environment, from common behaviours and preferences adopted by the group, and 
from relationships developed by colleagues and other people within the organization. 
Therefore, the characteristics of other people, average motivations, behaviours and 
attitudes can explain the emergence of similar preferences and perceptions among co-
workers and the impact on job satisfaction. At the same time, organizational policies 
also  influence  employee  perceptions,  especially  in  terms  of  social  or  non-self-
regarding  preferences:  distributive  and  procedural  fairness  are  estimated  by  the 
employee and can impact on his estimation of the individual well-being.  
 
This  complex  interrelation  among  different  variables  and  sources  of  satisfaction, 
among preferences, expectations, values and rewards, work and job characteristics 
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determinants in order to be tested in the following empirical models through linear 
regressions.  Specifically,  the  function  of  job  satisfaction  can  be  simplified  in  the 
following equation:  
 
                    x ORG Fd Fp Ri MOT NT S 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Re ;       (1) 
 
with S=job satisfaction; Ri =extrinsic and intrinsic rewards; Fp and Fd = procedural 
and  distributive  fairness;  and  where  the  model  assumes  that  expectations  are 
appropriately summarised by the natural (e.g. gender) and acquired (e.g. education) 
traits of the employee (variable NT), while MOT = intrinsic motivations of the worker 
approximates  the  employee's  values,  and  ORG = organizational characteristics  and 
working environment influence the perceptions of the employee. 
 
We expect that all the parameters  in the function (1) are significant and satisfaction 
is particularly influenced by the main proxies of workers‘ intrinsic motivations, social 
preferences,  and  other  organisational  and  non-monetary  aspects.  Specifically,  the 
most significant parameters are expected to be  expressing the weight of intrinsic 
motivations,  referred  to  intrinsic  rewards,  and  referred  to  distributive  and 
procedural  fairness.  Also  organizational  and  group  effects  can  be  positive  and 
significant,  although  they  differently  summarise  specific  proxies  of  the  working 
environment.  Finally,  some  variables  could  have  a  nil  or  negative  effect  on  job 
satisfaction, as expected for economic rewards (Re), extrinsic motivations and some 
of the natural and acquired traits which are related to workers‘ expectations. 
 
 
2. Employees’ well-being in Italian social enterprises 
 
We use the  ICSI2007 data (Indagine sulle Cooperative Sociali in Italia, Enquire on 
Social Cooperatives in Italy), which was collected by a pool of six universities
4 in 2006 
through questionnaires submitted to a representative sample of 4,134 employees and 
338  managers  of  411  Italian  cooperatives.  The  survey  includes  a  large  set  of 
questions ranging from socio-demographic controls (age, gender, education, etc.) to 
economic variables (e.g. wage), job characteristics (tasks, working hours, overtime) 
and job satisfaction with respect to a number of possible domains (relationship with 
colleagues, wage, type of job). Worker motivations and the perception of various 
organisational dimensions such as fairness, autonomy and teamwork were enquired 
as well. The result is an extremely rich database which allows for the study of the 
conditions and motivations of people employed in Italian not-for-profit enterprises.
5 
 
The initial sample was extracted from the ISTAT
6 2003 census on social cooperatives 
(ISTAT, 2003, 2007), which recorded 6,168 active cooperatives (with at least one 
employee) at the national level (Carpita et al., 2009, pp. 1-32). Representativeness at 
the national level was guaranteed by stratification on the basis of three parameters: 
typology of cooperative (Type A and Type B)
7, geographic representativeness by 
                                                 
4   Trento, Bergamo, Brescia, Milano Bicocca, Napoli Federico II and  Reggio Calabria. 
5   The questionnaire is omitted for reasons of space and is available from the authors upon request. 
6   Italian National Agency for Statistics. 
7   Italian social cooperatives are of two different typologies. Type A social cooperatives deliver social 
services, while Type B social cooperatives have been conceived by law for work integration of disadvantaged 13 
 
province (the Italian state is made of 20 regions and 107 provinces); and size (by 
classifying cooperatives as small when the number of employees is lower than 15, 
medium when it is included from 15 to 50, and big when the cooperative has more 
than 50 employees). The final sample is made up of 411 organisations. 
 
Four  different  questionnaires  were  distributed  to  the  selected  sample  concerning, 
respectively, paid and volunteer workers, cooperatives, and managers. In this article 
only data from the questionnaire distributed to paid workers and to the cooperative 
will be used. The main source of data is represented by the questionnaire delivered to 
paid  workers,  while  we  take  advantage  also  of  some  questions  enclosed  in  the 
questionnaire  delivered  to  cooperatives,  for  example  concerning  the  sector  of 
operation, dimension, and the typology of services provided.  The rate of individual 
non-responses  for  paid  workers  is  extremely  low  since  85%  of  involved  workers 
answered on average 90% of the 87 questions (56 single choice questions and 31 
multiple choice questions). 
 
2.1. Socio-demographic characteristics of workers  
 
The descriptive statistics of the socio-demographic features of workers, of job tasks 
and of their contractual position is reported in Table1. The average age is about 37. 
The workforce is predominantly female (74%). Most workers are married with children 
(59%). Half of the workforce achieved a secondary school education level, while 28 
percent achieved either a three years or a five years university degree.
8  
 
Open end contracts are dominant among the contractual relations perfected by the 
involved firms (81 per cent of cases). Part-time work is widespread and involves 32 
per cent of workers who freely chose a part-time position, and 12 per cent of workers 
who  were  confined  by  the  firm  in  a  part-time  position.  When  it  comes  to  the 
measurement of monetary variables, the average hourly wage was quite low even by 
Italian standards and equals 6.61 Euros.
9 Data from a previous study on the Italian 
                                                                                                                                                                  
workers, such as disabled and hard to employ workers. Most Type B social cooperatives work in traditional 
industrial sectors, but their workforce must include at least 30% of disadvantaged subjects. About 80% of the 
workers in the ICSI database work in Type A social cooperatives. Though the differences between type A and 
Type B social cooperatives are not explicitly considered in this paper, the econometric analysis in Section 3 
includes detailed control for the different typologies of activities and clients/users of both Type A and Type B 
cooperatives. The type A cooperative industry classification includes: social assistance; health and rehabilitation; 
education,  culture  and  recreation.  Type  A  cooperative  customers  include:  elderly  people;  children  or 
adolescents; mentally or psychically disabled; victims of addiction; unemployed; homeless; immigrants. The  -
type B cooperative industry classification includes: agriculture; green maintenance; garbage collection and other 
environmental services; manufacturing (leather, paper, wood); retail; bar and restaurants; laundries; housing 
and housing maintenance; housemaid services; informatics, printing and call centers. Employee categories for 
which type B cooperative promote work integration are: physically disabled and psychically disabled; victims of 
addiction; ex-convicted; immigrants; young unemployed; long-term unemployed. 
8   The Italian university system was reformed in 2000 and it is now based on the so called three plus two 
rule. After the initial three years that grant a degree equivalent to the BA, the students can choose to go on for 
further two years that are equivalent to the master level.  
9   The wage is recorded in the database as net take -home pay. The survey recorded monthly wages. To 
obtain the hourly wage we use the number of weekly contractual work hours. The gross cost of labor, given by 
the net hourly wage plus taxation plus social contribution was not recorded. As a rule of thumb, the gross cost of 
labor in Italy is about double the take home pay.  The exact coefficient of transformation varies on the bases of 
the marginal tax rate for different levels of income. The highest marginal rate in Italy, at the time of the survey, 
was 43%.   14 
 
social service sector conducted in 1998
10 show that wages in social cooperatives were 
the lowest in the sector when compared to other organizational forms, i.e. the public 
sector and for profit firms, and also lower than in nonprofit organizations (Borzaga 
and Tortia, 2006). The monetary equivalent of fringe benefits was added to the hourly 
wage, though only 8.3 per cent  of answerers reported this figure, and the difference 
between net hourly wage and net hourly wage plus fringe benefits is nil or negligible 
for all workers. The percentage of workers who stated an hourly wage lower than 5 
Euros, a measure roughly similar to the Italian union base wage, is equal to 9.4 (296 
workers). Six per cent of the workforce stated having received individual monetary 
incentives in the last accounting year, 2005). Among workers who perceived some 
monetary premium,  both individual and/or  collective, the average amount of the 
premium scored about 550 Euros yearly. This value is reduced to 77 Euros yearly if 
the whole workforce is considered. Workers employed by social cooperatives are to a 
great extent involved in interactions with clients  and other users of the organization 
(56%). Much lower is the percentage of workers who are involved in coordination and 
managerial tasks (6 per cent) or that perform exclusively manual tasks (9 per cent). 
As for organizational variables, we consider only f irm dimension, which equals an 
average of about 138 workers per firms, though variability across firms is extremely 
strong. 
                                                 
10   The database concerned the Italian social service sector, and was financed by the foundations FIVOL 
(Italian Foundation for voluntary work) and FEO (European Foundation for Employment).  15 
 
 







Minimum  Maximum 
Worker age  4134  37.40  9.01  17  73 
Tenure  4134  5.70  5.47  0  36 
Gender (1 = female)  4134  0.74  0.44  Dummy   
Married with children  4134  0.59  0.49  Dummy   
Education: secondary school  4134  0.52  0.50  Dummy   
Education: three years university 
degree 
4134  0.11  0.32  Dummy   
Education: five years university 
degree or higher 
4134  0.17  0.38  Dummy   
Open end contract  4134  0.81  0.39  Dummy   
Part-time  4134  0.32  0.47  Dummy   
Forced Part-time  4134  0.12  0.32  Dummy   
Hourly wage plus fringe benefits  3434  6.61  2.36  1.36  46.51 
Individual monetary premium 
received last year 
4105  0.06  0.23  Dummy   
Yearly amount of monetary 
premium 
4134  77.20  285.34  0  6000 
Job task: relationships with clients  4134  0.56  0.50  Dummy   
Job task: coordination  4134  0.06  0.23  Dummy   
Job task: manual worker  4134  0.09  0.29  Dummy   
Size of the firm (no. of employees)  4097  140.63  238.48  1  1702 




In order to inquire the nature of motivational drivers in social cooperatives, workers 
were  asked  to  answer  the  following  question:  ―In  general,  how  important  are  the 
following aspects of the work for you?‖  Descriptive statistics in Table 2 clearly show 
the  complexity  of  drivers  in  worker  behaviour  and  exclude  the  possibility  of  a 
simplistic reduction of motivations to some unique dimension, such as the monetary 
one. Workers are clearly motivated by social relatedness and usefulness of the job, 
but some other extrinsic and intrinsic aspects, such as job stability and the sharing of 
ideals  also  appear  to  play  a  crucial  role.  The employees  surveyed rank  wages  and 
other economic incentives only sixth in importance and other extrinsic aspects even 
lower. Each of the 12 motivational items was evaluated on a 1 to 12 scale.
11  
                                                 
11   The number of observations concerning motivations, satisfaction and fairness in Table 
2 to 4 is lower than 4134 due to  missing values. We proceeded to substitute the missing values with imputed 16 
 
 











Mode  Median 
Extrinsic motivations             
Flexibility of working hours  3922  8.00  3.09  37.4  9  9 
Wages and economic 
incentives 
3932  8.63  3.00  49.2  12  9 
Self-realization and career 
prospects 
3911  8.38  3.12  44.8  12  9 
Job stability  3950  9.52  2.79  61.9  12  11 
Intrinsic motivations             
Autonomy, variety and 
creativity  
3920  8.48  3.03  45.6  12  9 
Job coherent with individual 
training 
3915  7.06  3.69  33.0  1  8 
Social visibility of the job  3905  7.20  3.51  32.5  12  8 
Physical working environment  3927  7.44  3.69  38.4  12  8 
Sharing common ideals and 
values 
3944  8.77  3.25  52.5  12  10 
Altruistic and relational 
motivations 
           
Helping disadvantaged people  3954  9.48  2.84  62.3  12  10 
Relatedness on the job  3965  9.50  2.58  61.3  12  10 
Relatedness with people 
outside job 
3915  8.73  3.18  52.0  12  10 
Source: ICSI 2007 database 
 
Other regarding and relational motivations appear to be the most relevant ones, since 
most  workers  agree  on  the  importance  of  carrying  out  activities  useful  for  helping 
other  people  and  on  the  necessity  to  work  in  an  environment  where  relations  are 
good. Extrinsic aspects of the job receive a high degree of attention too, especially in 
relation  with  job  stability,  economic  remuneration  and  accomplishment  in  terms  of 
career  and  self-realization.  Among  the  items  of  intrinsic  motivation,  the  search  for 




                                                                                                                                                                  
values  for  all  the  variables  included  in  this  study.  This  procedure  allows  us  to  use  imputed  data  in  the 
econometric analyses in Section 3 in order to minimize the loss of usable observations. 
12   Even if these data are not displayed here and used in the analysis, the ICSI 2007 database includes also 
information on the features of workers' attitudes toward work before entering the organization and on the 
motivations for choosing a specific organization. Employees claim that before entering a social cooperative they 
were attracted by the opportunity to establish new relationships and by autonomy, but they were also interested 
in a job that met their economic needs. Working in a social cooperative, however, seem to increase their view of 
the job as an experience that enriched them personally, and gave them an opportunity for helping other people, 
improving relationships, and their professional satisfaction. 17 
 
In  order  to  assess  the  hypothesized  three  subdimensions,  we  quantify  the  ordinal 
categories for all the items of the involved Likert-type scale for the job motivations, 
and then perform an explorative factor analysis. Then we use the Categorical Principal 
Component Analysis (CatPCA; Michailidis and de Leeuw, 1998; Meulman et. al, 2004) 
for  quantifying  ordinal  categories,  with  the  number  of  the  components  p  =  3,  the 
number  of  the  assumed  subdimensions  for  the  job  motivations.  The  optimal 
quantifications are assigned to the categories of each item minimizing (by means of 
an alternating least squares algorithm) the following loss function simultaneously over 








j j || Y G O || tr Y) L(O,  
 
with  tr||·||
2  the  trace  operator  of the  squared norm  of a  matrix,  Gj  the  indicator 
matrix of item j, O the n×p matrix of object scores for the n subjects, and Yj the 
matrix containing the category quantifications of item j. As goodness of fit statistics 
we  consider  the  Generalized  Cronbach‘s  Alpha  (GCA)  index  and  the  Variance 
Accounted For (VAF) index, that are normalized (in the interval [0;100]) indices based 
on the total eigenvalue of the CatPCA solution. The quantified variables obtained from 
the  CatPCA  are  then  used  for  the  standard  Exploratory  Factor  Analysis  (EFA; 
extraction method principal axis factoring and rotation method varimax with Kaiser 
normalization; Fabrigar et al., 1999) to identify the hypothesized subdimensions by 
inspecting the factor loadings of the rotated solution. In this case, as goodness of fit 
statistic  we  consider  the  Rotation  Explained  Variance  (REV)  index,  which  is  the 
normalized cumulative sums of squared loadings of the EFA rotated solution. The main 
results of this analysis are displayed in Table A.1 of the Appendix (columns EFA). The 
fit statistics are rather high (GCA = 94, VAF = 58 and REV = 45), and single out the 
three  measurable  subdimensions  that  appear  to  be  predominantly  connected  to, 
respectively, (a) relational and other regarding motivations; (b) extrinsic motivations 
linked  to  the  work  environment;  (c)  intrinsic  motivations  linked  to  involvement, 
sharing of values, and achievement on the job. The factor loadings of the EFA rotated 
solution  for  some  items  (Hours,  Coherence,  Ambient,  Autonomy  and  Others)  show 
that these three subdimensions are not completely disjoint: each single measure for a 
latent subdimension cannot be interpreted as independent from the others. Moreover, 
the position of the item Ambient (―Physical working environment‖) is anomalous since 
it can appear to represent an extrinsic feature of the job (for this dimension the factor 
loading is equal to 0.39), while it is categorized by the EFA in the intrinsic motivational 
components  (for  this  dimension  the  factor  loading  is  equal  to  0.61).  One  possible 
explanation is that workers perceive the surrounding environment as an inner part of 
their  activity, while regulation, for example concerning work-hours, is perceived as 
imposed  by  external  decision-makers,  hence  it  enters  the  extrinsic  component  of 
motivations.  
 
2.3. The work, wages and fairness 
 
The average wage in 2005 was quite low if compared with the public sector and if the 
level of education is taken into account (Table 3). The majority of full-time workers 
earns less than 1200 Euros net per month, with an average of 1010 Euros, while part-





Table 3. Average salaries (in Euros) 
 




Monthly salary     
Full-time  1010.40  31.5 
Part-time  688.04  36.8 
Hourly wage     
Full-time  6.36  23.7 
Part-time  7.01  12.9 
Source: ICSI 2007 database. 
 
When  analyzing  the  organizational  environment,  we  first  take  into  consideration 
distributive fairness. Workers were asked to evaluate their salaries as ―fair‖ (assigning 
a score of 4), ―unfair‖ (scores between 1 and 3) and ―more than fair‖ (scores from 5 
to 7). Table 4 shows that employees in social cooperatives perceive their salaries as 
fair (scores near 4) when they compare them with those of colleagues and superiors, 
and even with market averages. When workers consider the economic possibilities of 
their  firm,  results are  again positive  since  most  workers  perceive  their  wage  as  at 
least  fair.  In  this  case  modal  values  stress  the  dominance  of  fair  outcomes  in  a 
predominant  way.  More  problematic  are  the  results  concerning  the  perception  of 
fairness relative to the individual aspects of the work activity, as when the wage is 
evaluated in relation to stress and tension, responsibility and the effort required on 
the job. In these cases, average values are close to 3 and modal values highlight a 
lower  than  fair  perception  of  the  wage.  Still  more  problematic  are  the  results 
concerning the perception of fairness relative to the cost of life in terms of purchasing 
power of the wage. In this case, answers stress overwhelmingly a level of wages that 
is too low. However, this negative perception is likely to be common to many other 
occupations and sectors in the Italian economy, given the low general level of wages 










                                                 
13   However, from 1998 (the data of our previous survey) and 2007 net salaries increased in monetary 
terms by more than 30 per cent on average, climbing to about 1,000 Euros a month for full-time employees in 
2007. This increase is partially explained by increased work-hours, since the hourly wage increased at a slower 
pace. The overall increase is still significant in real terms: discounting by annual inflation, the salary for full-time 
employees amounted to 863.88 Euros per month in 2007, compared to 768.24 in 1998, while the hourly rate 
rose to 5.91 Euros compared to 5.14 in 1998. 19 
 
Table 4. Distributive fairness  
All variables measured on a 1 



















The wage is fair in comparison 
with… 
           
Level of education  3738  3.26  1.39  46.8  37.5  15.6 
Training and experience  3841  3.29  1.36  50.4  34.9  14.8 
On-the-job responsibility and 
role 
3876  3.13  1.38  56.4  31.7  11.9 
Effort required  3893  3.15  1.38  56.8  31.0  12.2 
Stress and tension  3850  2.99  1.44  61.8  25.6  12.6 
Loyalty to the cooperative  3686  3.56  1.45  38.6  40.9  20.4 
Collective aspects             
The wages of colleagues in the 
cooperative 
3240  3.77  1.18  22.2  49.1  28.9 
The wages of employees in 
other organizations 
2928  3.40  1.44  33.7  30.4  35.9 
The wages of superiors  2821  3.79  1.25  20.6  40.5  38.8 
The economic possibilities of 
the firm 
3050  3.87  1.19  27.0  55.8  17.2 
Distributive fairness, overall  3666  3.36  1.29  48.7  34.1  17.1 
The cost of life  4037  1.97  1.10  90.1  8.1  1.8 
Source: ICSI 2007 database 
 
Procedural  fairness  is  instead  evaluated  looking  to  processes,  more  than  to 
organizational  outcomes.  The  main  aspects  of  procedural  fairness  taken  into 
consideration relate to information flows, and to the transparency and equitableness 
of procedures in decision-making processes involving workers' personal position in the 
firm. Procedural fairness is usually sorted in a personal component, defined quality of 
treatment  —  which  refers  to  the  perception  of  fair  treatment  in  the  relations  with 
superiors — and into a component that relates instead to the general working of the 
organization  independently  of  workers'  relation  with  their  superiors  —  labelled 
procedural  fairness  proper  or  quality  of  decision-making  (Tyler  and  Blader,  2000, 
2003). As regards quality of treatment,  data on relationships with superiors shows 
that employees give extremely good evaluations of the behaviours of their superiors, 
who are understood to be kind and helpful (level of agreement 6.2 on a scale from 1 
to 7), perceptive to their needs, both personal and familiar and on-the-job, and open 
to paying attention to workers‘ proposals, supply advice, and correctly evaluate the 
quality of their results. 
 
Fairness of decision-making is also perceived in a very positive way, though average 
scores are slightly lower than in the case of relations with superiors (Table 5). Scores 
are especially high when the quality of advice and guidelines communicated by the 
organization  considered,  the  effort  to  keep  to  the  promises  expressed  to  workers  
(―the social cooperative abides with what has been promised‖). The overall measure 20 
 
of procedural fairness (5.9 on a 1 to 7 Lickert scale) mirrors the positive evaluation 
given by workers. If quality of treatment and quality of decision-making are related to 
worker on-the-job well-being in terms of satisfaction, then it is clear that they can 
represent  a  competitive  advantage  related  to  the  inclusive  features  of  the 
organizational form. They can positively impact workers welfare and expectations, and 
possibly  balance  some  critical  aspects  related  to  the  perception  of  distributive 
fairness.  
 
Table 5. Procedural fairness  








Mode  Median 
Quality of treatment. Your 
superiors... 
         
Are kind and helpful  3886  6.15  1.23  7  7 
Are sensitive to personal and family 
needs 
3817  5.95  1.32  7  6 
Are sensitive to on-the-job needs  3785  5.70  1.35  7  6 
Pay attention to workers‘ ideas and 
proposals 
3799  5.56  1.50  7  6 
Give advice and guidance  3799  5.57  1.50  7  6 
Give adequate weight to the quality of 
results 
3806  5.78  1.38  7  6 
Quality of decision-making. The 
firm... 
         
Gives advice and guidelines  3892  5.29  1.63  7  6 
Collects complete information on 
worker activity 
3722  5.10  1.67  7  5 
Treats its workers in the same manner  3581  5.10  1.90  7  6 
Has clear and shared goals  3697  5.23  1.65  7  6 
Abides with what has been promised  3767  5.67  1.55  7  6 
Quality of decision-making, overall  3885  5.90  1.39  7  6 
Source: ICSI 2007 database 
 
CatPCA  and  EFA  were  performed  also  in  the  case  of  fairness  like  in  the  case  of 
motivations  (Table  A.2  in  the  Appendix):  considering  the  four  hypothesized 
subdimensions  (a)  distributive  fairness  -  individual  and  (b)  distributive  fairness  - 
others, (c) procedural fairness (also defined quality of decision-making since it refers 
to the routine procedures of decision-making characterizing the organization), and (d) 
relational fairness (also defined quality of treatment or interactional fairness since it 
refers to the relations between workers and their superiors), the fit statistics are high 
(GCA = 98, VAF = 74 and REV = 65). The rotated solution show that, as expected, 
each sub-dimension of the distributive fairness has moderately high factor loadings on 
the other sub-dimension, and that for the procedural and the interactional fairness 
there is the same empirical evidence too. 
 
2.5. The context, rewards, and features of the job 
 
Finally to be considered among factors potentially affecting worker well-being is the 21 
 
context of operation and the features of job tasks. As a representation of the context 
we selected some variables that appeared most likely to be connected to worker well-
being. They are interpreted in terms of the incentive mix offered by the organization, 
which  encloses  both  monetary  and  non-monetary  components.  For  example,  the 
ability of the firm to grant to workers stability of employment, on-the-job autonomy, 
and participation in decision-making can result in higher worker well-being, even if the 
wage is kept constant. Hence, in our analysis, these are instances on non-monetary 
incentives (Borzaga and Tortia, 2006). The considered set of contextual variables is 
not exhaustive. However, the objective of our analysis was to put together a set of 
relevant dimensions, both individual and organizational, that necessarily depend on 
the context of operation on the one hand, and that, on the other hand, can impact at 
the individual level in terms of well-being. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 
6. 
 















Professional growth  3999  4.29  1.67  7  4  1-7 
Autonomy in the organization of 
job tasks 
4017  4.70  1.96  7  7  1-7 
Autonomy in problem solving  3949  4.25  1.95  7  4  1-7 
Job stability  3863  3.82  1.08  5  4  1-5 
Monetary incentives  3829  1.97  1.11  5  1  1-5 
Participation in the mission of the 
organization 
3841  3.13  1.24  5  3  1-5 
Participation in decision-making  3852  2.88  1.26  5  3  1-5 
Source: ICSI 2007 database 
 
The organizations involved in the ICSI survey appear able to guarantee a good level 
of professional growth, and on-the job autonomy. Social cooperatives seem to take as 
one  of  their  main  aims  the  protection  of  employment  also  in  periods  of  economic 
crisis.  Less  convincing  results are  obtained  in the  case  of participation  in  decision-
making  and  in the  mission of the  organization,  which score  around  3  on a  1  to  5 
Lickert  scale.  Workers  seem  to  give  a  ―fair‖  evaluation  concerning  involvement 
processes,  which,  however,  appear  to  require  improvement.  As  expected,  workers‘ 
judgment concerning the ability of the organization to use intensively and effectively 
monetary incentives is substantially lower than for any other typology of incentives. 
This is coherent with the idea that cooperatives are accustomed to pay low wages and 
to be evaluated critically on this dimension, but, at the same time, they are able to 
get very good evaluations of non-monetary organisational dimension. 
 
2.4. Job satisfaction 
 
The best possible proxy of workers‘ on-the-job well-being is represented by the stated 
degree  of  satisfaction  with  the  activity  performed.  Stated  satisfaction  expresses  a 
synthetic  evaluation  of  the  ability  of  the  organization  to  fulfil  workers'  needs  and 
expectations concerning different job dimensions. The survey questionnaire includes a 
list of 26 items of satisfaction concerning different aspects of the job, including the 
monetary remuneration and other outcomes, relational and procedural aspects, and 22 
 
other aspects of the working environment.
14 Not all items will be used in this study. A 
selection was carried out by the authors on the basis of the expected relevance for a 
comprehensive  and  synthetic  evaluation  of  worker  satisfaction.  The  selection  of 
satisfaction items stressed the relevance of the intrinsic and extrinsic components of 
satisfaction, since these are most likely to be related to worker motivations, to the 
inclusive governance of the organization in terms of fairness and transparency of 
procedures, and to the incentive mix implemented by the organization and directed to 
valorise both monetary and non-monetary aspects of the job. Average values of the 
12 selected items are displayed in Table 7. Beyond the selected items, we add the 
individual items concerning overall job satisfaction and wage satisfaction. This way we 
aim at checking the coherence of the results concerning the selected aspects of the 
working environment, with the synthetic evaluation of the job as a whole and of the 
monetary aspects. 
 
Average  satisfaction  is  relatively  high  for  all  the  considered  items  apart  from  the 
wage. However, satisfaction in general appears lower than in the case of procedural 
fairness and interactional fairness (Table 7). The items of extrinsic satisfaction show a 
strong homogeneity of results and high values, as also testified by their modal and 
median values. Stronger variability is shown by the average values of the items of 
intrinsic satisfaction. Social cooperatives appear particularly strong in satisfying their 
workforce  in  terms  of  autonomy  and  overall  sense  of  self-realization.  A  good 
performance  is  also  shown  in  terms  of  transparency  of  procedures,  recognition  of 
workers‘ contributions, and the ability to guarantee professional development. More 
problematic  are the  results concerning  involvement  in decision-making, which does 
not appear to be a characterizing feature of social cooperatives. Finally, weak results 
matching  the  relatively  low  score  of  wage  satisfaction  are  achieved  in  the  case  of 
achieved and expected career prospects. Though the degree of wage satisfaction is 
low, the overall degree of job satisfaction is fairly high and this shows  the ability of 
these  firms  to  fulfil  workers‘  expectations  and  needs  on  most  dimensions  of  their 
activity. 
                                                 
14   The English version of the questionnaire is available from the authors upon request. 23 
 
 
Table 7. Satisfaction with different aspects of the job 










Extrinsic aspects           
Work hours  4035  5.35  1.58  7  6 
Flexibility of work hours  3966  5.41  1.55  7  6 
Job security  3984  5.34  1.69  7  6 
Work environment  3985  5.32  1.59  7  6 
Social security  3946  5.49  1.61  7  6 
Intrinsic aspects           
Involvement in the decision-making 
process 
3999  4.29  1.67  4  4 
Transparency of procedures  4027  4.90  1.69  4  5 
Recognition of his/her work by the 
cooperative 
4019  4.81  1.70  4  5 
Professional development  3971  4.64  1.59  4  5 
Autonomy in decision-making  3986  5.07  1.48  6  5 
Achieved and expected career 
prospects 
3861  3.83  1.71  4  4 
Self-realization  3947  4.92  1.63  6  5 
Variety and creativity of the job  3991  5.20  1.49  6  5 
Wage satisfaction  4072  3.80  1.70  6  6 
The job as a whole  3989  5.46  1.32  4  4 
Source: ICSI 2007 database 
 
CatPCA and EFA were performed on the whole set of satisfaction items like in the case 
of the motivational and fairness items (Table A.3 in the Appendix). Fit statistics are 
rather high (GCA = 93, VAF = 57 and REV = 49). It is important to note that for the 
construction of the extrinsic job satisfaction we do not include the item of the wage 
satisfaction. The first reason for this choice is statistical and refers to the fact that 
wage satisfaction does not fit with the two components singled out by factor analysis 
(intrinsic and extrinsic satisfaction). It appears to be positioned in between the two 
components, thus creating interpretation problems. The second reason is substantive: 
in  our  interpretation,  wage  satisfaction  represents  satisfaction  with  outcomes 
measured in monetary terms. Hence, its determinants are to be evaluated separately 
from the other items, which instead represent aspects of the job and of the working 
environment.
15  The factor loadings of the EFA rotated solution show that the two 
subdimensions are not completely disjoint: each single measure for a latent sub -
dimension cannot be interpreted as independent from the other. Extrinsic satisfaction 
relates most of all to the work environment, to the flexibility of work-hours and to job 
security. The intrinsic components, as they emerge from the considered items, are 
similar to the idea of satisfaction with self -fulfilment  and  achievement in terms of 
professional growth, autonomy, and career. We add the satisfaction with the job as a 
whole and wage satisfaction. 
Some  empirical  studies  and  theories  based  on  morale  models  assert  that  job 
                                                 
15  As shown in Table 2, the motivational items enclose instead the wage and monetary incentives. The 
different choice relative to the case of wage satisfaction can be explained again in two ways: from a statistical 
point of view, motivations driven by monetary incentives fit correctly in the extrinsic component of motivations. 
In substantive terms, it appears correct to study the interaction between monetary motivations and the different 
components of satisfaction, both intrinsic and extrinsic. As shown in Table 10, monetary motivations seem to 
dampen satisfaction, more than to enhance it. 24 
 
satisfaction influences worker behaviour in terms of productivity (effort exerted) and 
loyalty  to  the  organization.  Nevertheless,  nonprofit  organizations  and  social 
enterprises have been criticized and considered sources of employment for workers 
without  or  with  few  other  job  opportunities.  Our  data  shed  some  light  on  these 
contrasting  interpretations  by  revealing  patterns  of  workers‘  loyalty  in  terms  of 
willingness to stay with the organization (Table 8).
16 Loyalty appears high and seems 
to have increased over time: 74.1 per cent of the interviewee s want to stay in the 
organization as long as possible because they are satisfied with their jobs, while 13.5 
per cent want to stay at least for some years. Only 6.5 per cent of workers intend to 
stay because they have no job alternatives. This is true the low level of wages and the 
weak  perception  of  distributive  fairness  notwithstanding.  Hence,  weak  monetary 
incentives do not appear to discourage workers from desiring the continuation of their 
activity in the firm also when a long temporal horizon is considered. When employees 
are differentiated by tenure, it appears that less than 10 per cent of workers that have 
been joining the firm for more than 10 years intend to search for another job. On the 
other hand, 20 per cent of individuals employed since less than two years look at the 
experience in their firm as a short term job. Improved training is their main aim.
17 
 
Table 8. Loyalty to the organization  
Intend to…  % 
Stay as long as possible  74.1   
Stay only some years  13.5   
Leave as soon as possible  1.9   
Stay because of no alternatives  6.5   
Source: ICSI 2007 database 
 
 
3. The impact of motivational and organizational variables on worker well-
being  
 
In this section we first describe the statistical techniques that we used to reduce the 
number  of  dimensions  in  the  data  and  obtain  synthetic  measurements  of  worker 
satisfaction and motivations. We then proceed to describe the results of econometric 
estimates  concerning  the  impact  of  motivational  and  organizational  variables  on 
worker well-being in Italian social cooperatives. 
 
As explained in section 2.1, in order to make sense of the complexity of the variables 
discussed in the descriptive part of the work, the items concerning worker satisfaction 
and  motivations  at  the  individual  level  and  fairness  and  incentives  at  the 
organizational  level,  were  first  transformed  into  numerical  variables  by  means  of 
                                                 
16   Unluckily, the ICSI 2007 database does not include interviews with workers who have resigned from 
organizations. However, turnover is low and this gives testimony to the stability of employment and adds to the 
idea that workers do indeed desire to keep on with their activity in the firm as long as possible. 
17   Though the ICSI 2007 database encloses also data on the stated degree of effort exerted on the job, the 
analysis of effort and productivity is likely to imply additional difficulties that cannot be dealt with in this paper. 
For example, the relation between effort and satisfaction is affected by severe problems of reverse causality and 
identification. Hence this analysis is postponed to future work.  25 
 
CatPCA and then grouped into a limited number of dimensions by means of EFA. We 
then obtain subjective measures of quality of work for each sub-dimension of these 
constructs  using  the  Rasch  Analysis  with  the  Rating  Scale  Model  (Andrich,  1978; 
Wright and Masters, 1982; Brentari et al., 2007, Brentari and Golia, 2008). According 
with this model, the probability that worker i answers x on item j with (c + 1) ordered 
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The probability ijx depends on worker attitude and item difficulty; in this context, the 
latter indicates how difficult the  item  is to endorse. The parameter i identifies the 
―level of attitude‖ (for example the ―level of job satisfaction‖) of worker i, j the mean 
difficulty to endorse item j and h - called threshold - is the point of equal probability of 
categories (h – 1) and h. Note that this model assumes unidimensionality and that the 
thresholds for all the items are the same, i.e. the items share the same rating scale 
structure. As goodness of fit statistic we consider the Rasch‘s Alpha (RA
18) index, the 
raw Score to Measure correlation (SM) index, and the Explained Variance (EV) index, 
that are both normalized indexes (in the interval [0;100]) of the obtained solution. 
 
Finally, the interpretation and evaluation of the results for each item is based on three 
standard statistics used in the Rasch Analysis: Difficulty (the estimate of how difficult 
it is, on average, for the workers to endorse each item), Infit (the weighted mean-
square of the standardized residuals of the model, with expectation 1), and  Ptmea 
(the  point-measure  correlation  between  the  observations  on  the  item  and  the 
corresponding person measures). 
 
In  the  case  of  job  satisfaction,  three  Rasch  measures  were  extracted  and  named 
intrinsic, extrinsic and total satisfaction.  
 
The main results of the Rasch analysis are shown in the right side (columns RSM) of 
the  tables  in  the  Appendix.  Measurements  were  produced  for  the  three  different 
components of worker motivations evidenced in Table 2, and the same was done in 
the  case  of  distributive  fairness,  procedural  fairness  (quality  of  decision-making), 
relations with superiors (quality of treatment), intrinsic and extrinsic job satisfaction. 
 
Using Rasch Analysis, preliminary results for the motivation measures revealed that 
the order of the 12 categories of the scale is not respected, so the responses were 
merged together, obtaining the same 5-level response scale for each item: C1-C3, 
C4-C6, C7-C8, C9-C10 and C11-12. Probably because of the few categories and items, 
the diagnostic statistics for the RSM show that the reliability of these three measures 
are  rather  low  (RA  between  48  for  relational  motivations  and  66  for  intrinsic 
motivation), but they have high correlations with the raw scores (SM between 94 for 
                                                 
18   We use the person reliability index of the model (Linacre, 1997). As in the standard item analysis, in this 
study the threshold roughly distinguish between low and high reliability of a measure with the value of the RA 
index set at 70%. 26 
 
extrinsic motivations and 96 for relational motivations) and good enough explained 
variances (EV about 66). The item diagnostic statistics Infit (between 0.79 and 1.11) 
and Ptmea (between 0.58 and 0.80) show quite good overall results. Among the items 
of extrinsic motivations we find that Stability is easier (i.e. generally these workers 
consider this aspect of the work as one of the most important), while Hours is more 
difficult (i.e. generally these workers consider this aspect of the work as one of the 
less important). Among the items of intrinsic motivations, Ideals is more likely to be 
important while Coherence and Utility are more likely to be unimportant. Among the 
items  of  relational  motivations,  Others  and  Colleagues  are  more  likely  to  be 
important, while Users are more likely to be less important. 
 
For  the  three  different  response  scales  of  the  fairness  dimension,  the  preliminary 
Rasch  Analysis  suggests  the  merging  of  categories  C5-C6  for  distributive  fairness, 
obtaining a 6-level response scale, and of categories C1-C3 for interactional fairness, 
obtaining a 5-level response scale; diagnostic statistics (RA, SM and EV) for each of 
these  four  measures  show  in  particular  rather  high  reliability  for  the  ―individual‖ 
distributive fairness (RA = 89) and relatively low reliability for the ―others‖ distributive 
fairness (RA = 63). The item diagnostic statistics Infit and Ptmea show good discrete 
overall results for the items: Effort and Loyalty (Infit 0.68 and 1.31 respectively) are 
exceptions  for  the  ―individual‖  distributive  fairness.  Among  the  items  of  this  sub-
dimension,  Loyalty  is  easier to endorse  (i.e.  generally  the  workers  think  that  their 
overall pay is quite fair for this aspect), while Stress is more difficult to endorse (i.e. 
generally the workers think that their overall pay is not so fair for this aspect). For the 
―others‖  distributive  fairness,  the  item  Coop  Resources  is  perceived  as  fairer  and 
Wage Others is more difficult to be perceived as fair; the items related to the wage of 
colleagues  and  superiors  have  roughly  the  same  intermediate  level  of  perceived 
fairness. As for procedural fairness (quality of decision-making), the item Respect is 
easily perceived as fair while Information and Equality are unlikely to be perceived as 
fair.  Finally,  among  the  items  of  interactional  fairness  (relations  with  superiors), 
Availability is easily perceived as fair, while Listening and Advice are more difficult to 
be perceived as fair. 
 
For the two job satisfaction measures, the preliminary Rasch Analysis suggests to use 
for all these items a 5-level response scale (ordered categories C1, C2-C3, C4, C5-C6, 
C7). The obtained measures show fairly good reliability (RA index equal to 74 and 87 
respectively),  high  score  to  measure  correlation  (SM  index  equal  to  94  and  97 
respectively) and high explained variance (EV index equal to 54 and 66 respectively); 
furthermore, items do not misfit (Infit index between 0.88 and 1.12) and have high 
correlation  with  the  related  measures  (Ptmea  index  between  0.67  and  0.77). 
Considering the Difficulty index for extrinsic job satisfaction, we can see that Security 
is the aspect more easily satisfied, Ambient is the aspect more difficult to satisfy, and 
that  Hours  and  Flexibility  have  roughly  the  same  mean  level  of  difficulty  to  be 
satisfied.  However,  the  full  range  of  the  difficulty  of  these  items  is  not  very  large 
(from -0.14 to 0.10). In the case of intrinsic job satisfaction, Autonomy is the aspect 
more  easily  satisfied  and  Career  is  the  aspect  more  difficult  to  satisfy.  For  this 
measure, the range of the item difficulties is wider than the previous one (from -0.55 
to 0.98). 
 
The  descriptive  statistics  of  the  Rasch  measurements  obtained  from  the  foregoing 
analysis are reported in Table 9. 
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Table 9.  Rasch measurements  
  No. of obs.  Average 
Standard 
deviation  Min  Max 
Satisfaction           
Intrinsic satisfaction  4134  0.70  1.73  -5.39  6.13 
Extrinsic satisfaction  4134  1.43  1.67  -4.37  5.02 
Total satisfaction  4134  0.82  1.21  -5.18  5.77 
Motivations           
Extrinsic motivations  4134  0.85  1.33  -3.67  3.65 
Intrinsic motivations  4134  0.41  1.16  -3.40  3.40 
Altruistic motivations  4134  1.28  1.46  -3.67  3.44 
Fairness            
Distributive fairness (individual component)  4134  -0.96  2.33  -6.32  7.23 
Distributive fairness (comparative component)  4134  -0.30  2.04  -5.67  7.67 
Procedural fairness (decision-making)  4134  1.52  2.05  -4.33  5.20 
Relations with superiors (quality of treatment)  4134  1.60  2.14  -4.88  4.96 
Source: Our elaboration on the ICSI 2007 database 
 
We endeavour to single out the individual and the organizational components in the 
interaction between motivations, fairness on the one hand, and worker well-being on 
the other. We do this by matching each individual worker with the 320 organizations 
that  participated  in  the  study.  This  way  we  can  define  two  new  centred  variables, 
calculated  as  individual  deviations  from  organizational  averages  and  organizational 












i RF RF RF   ;               (1) 
 
where RSi represent the three Rasch measurements for satisfaction, RMi represent the 
three  Rasch  measurements  for  motivations,  and  RFi  represent  the  four  Rasch 
measurements  for  fairness;  i=1,2,…4134  represents  individual  worker  cases,  and 
k=1,2,…320 represent the organizations involved in the ICSI survey. In the following 
regression models we use the centred variables (1) and the organizational averages 
that are orthogonal: this specification, known as the Cronbach model, allows to obtain 
the  decomposition of  total  effect on the  dependent  variable  in  within  and  between 
effects (Kreft and De Leeuw, 1988). In our study this means that with the models we 
can  evaluate  the  impact  on  satisfaction  of  various  individual  and  organizational 
dimensions both at the worker‘s level and at the cooperative‘s level: in this second 
case, motivations are connected to the recruitment choices of the organizations and 
fairness is connected with the climate in the organizations. 
 
3.1. OLS estimation of the determinants of worker well-being 
 
The econometric analysis is implemented in a cross section environment by means of 
standard  OLS  estimates  which  allow  for  robust  standard  errors  to  check  for 28 
 
heteroskedasticity  of  the  error  term.
19  In the analysis we use the three groups of 
Rasch variables just   described. We add the socio -demographic and organizational 
variables in Table 1 in order to control for the different characteristics of workers and 
for firm dimension. Finally, we also use the group of variables in Table 6, which 
represent  the  individual   perception  of  the  instruments  or  incentives  used  by  the 
organization to boost worker motivations and productivity.
20  
 
We produce four different models in which we add one at a time the four groups of 
regressors  just  described.  Satisfaction  is  used  as  output  variable  representing  the 
subjective,  self-reported  degree  of  worker  on-the-job  well-being.  Beyond  the  three 
Rasch measures for satisfaction we also produce OLS estimates where the dependent 
variable is overall job satisfaction and wage satisfaction. Though this is not the best 
methodological  solution,  given  the  ordered  nature  of  these  last  two  variables,  we 
chose the OLS solutions and not non-linear models such as the ordered probit in order 
to retain methodological homogeneity and to allow for a rough comparison with the 
results obtained using the Rasch measurements of satisfaction as output variables. 
Following  Gelman  (2008),  for  overcome  the  problem  to  compare  the  estimated 
coefficients of regressors with different scaling (dummies 0-1 and quantitative), they 
were rescaled by subtracting the mean and dividing by 2sd (two standard deviations), 
so that a 1-unit change in the rescaled predictor can be interpret as a change from 
1sd below the mean to 1sd above; instead, the dependent variables are standardized 
using the usual transformation. Therefore, for the model with dependent variable a 
standardized measure of job satisfaction, the estimated regression coefficient for the 
rescaled  measure  of  fairness  corresponds  to  the  impact  on  the  job  satisfaction  - 
measured in its sd unit and at the mean levels of the other regressors - of fairness 
switching from a worker with low fairness perception (1 s.d. below the mean) to a 
worker with high fairness perception (1 s.d. above the mean). Note that this linear 




The  first  model  (Table  10)  considers  only  the  socio-demographic  variables.
21  The 
results of this exercise represent an important benchmark for the understandin g of 
how the model is modified by adding new variables to our analysis, i.e. motivations, 
fairness and incentives. The first model can be algebraically represented as follows: 
 
i i i i i C S                            (2) 
 
Where Si is the level of satisfaction for each individual worker i, and it depends on a 
vector  os  socio-demographic  variable  Ci;  while  i    is  a  random  error  term.  Results 
concerning socio-demographic variables broadly confirm what is already found in the 
literature. Satisfaction increases with age, but this is true most of all for the extrinsic 
component of satisfaction, while wage satisfaction is unaffected.  
 
                                                 
19   Discussion of endogeneity issues is postponed to the end of this section.    
20   We did not calculate the Rasch measurement of this fifth group of variables, because their substantive 
heterogeneity, which impede their fit into one unique Rasch variable.  
21   We also included in all estimates the controls for the typology of services produced and for the typology 
of clients served which are listed in footnote 10. These coefficients will not be displayed for reasons of space and 
because virtually all of them are not statistically significant.  29 
 
Women  are  generally  more  satisfied  than  men,  but  only  for  the  extrinsic  and 
monetary  components  of  satisfaction.  Educated  workers,  above  all,  university 
graduates, are less satisfied and the effect is strongest in the case of the monetary 
aspects and, in turn, these results are likely to be connected with the more precarious 
position  of  women  on  the  labour  market.  Open-end  contracts  appear  to  exert  a 
negative impact on satisfaction. However, this is true only in the case of the intrinsic 
and monetary components, because of a likely phenomenon of burn out of intrinsic 
motivations.  On  the  other  hand,  extrinsic  satisfaction  is  enhanced  by  long  term 
contractual relations, probably because of the possibility to enjoy a quieter working 
environment, which, however, does not lead to improved career prospects and higher 
wages. Part-time work generates a general negative impact on satisfaction, though 
monetary outcomes seem to be enhanced. The negative effect becomes all the more 
strong for all the specifications of satisfaction when part-time is a solution imposed by 
the firm. A feeling of exclusion and reduced professional growth and career prospects 
is likely to determine this result. The hourly wage shows a strong positive linkage with 
intrinsic satisfaction and, as expected, with wage satisfaction. However, as observed 
in various other contributions (Borzaga and Tortia, 2006, for example) it is unrelated 
with overall job satisfaction. The wage is perceived as an intrinsic aspect of the work 
relation, as it is considered to be the outcome of professional growth and part of the 
self-realization of workers. The presence of individual monetary incentives shows a 
general  positive  relation  with  satisfaction  in  both  its  intrinsic  and  extrinsic 
components, though, interestingly enough, the linkage with wage satisfaction is not 
significant.  The  monetary  amount  of  the  monetary  incentives  received  annually  is 
positively related only to intrinsic satisfaction. When the typology of tasks performed 
by workers is considered, the interaction with clients induces a general reduction in 
the  level  of satisfaction,  both  intrinsic  and  extrinsic,  and  also  in  wage  satisfaction, 
though  this  last  effect  is  not  statistically  significant.  This  evidence  is  likely  to  be 
related  to  the  intrinsic  difficulties  linked  to  the  delivery  of  non-standardized  and 
relational services such as social services, which are likely to engender a high degree 
of stress in the operators. Manual workers are instead more satisfied than the others 

































  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff. 
   (t)  (t)  (t)  (t)  (t) 
Age  0,060  0,192  0,120  0,146  0,050 
  (1.78)  (5.49)  (3.57)  (4.27)  (1.47) 
Tenure  0,022  -0,004  0,004  -0,054  -0,034 
  (0.55)  (-0.12)  (0.11)  (-1.51)  (-0.96) 
Gender  0,040  0,084  0,058  0,116  0,072 
  (1.25)  (2.59)  (1.75)  (3.49)  (2.23) 
Married with children  -0,036  -0,026  -0,034  0,032  0,044 
  (-1.16)  (-0.86)  (-1.13)  (1.04)  (1.44) 
Secondary school  0,034  0,034  0,038  0,010  0,000 
  (0.99)  (0.93)  (1.10)  (0.27)  (0.02) 
University degree and higher  0,004  -0,048  -0,016  -0,084  -0,138 
  (0.09)  (-1.36)  (-0.44)  (-2.24)  (-3.85) 
Open end contract  -0,070  0,120  0,004  -0,034  -0,136 
  (-2.10)  (3.67)  (0.11)  (-0.97)  (-4.17) 
Part-time  -0,08  0,040  -0,044  -0,054  0,074 
  (-2.44)  (1.17)  (-1.32)  (-1.65)  (2.21) 
Forced part-time  -0,258  -0,178  -0,260  -0,220  -0,244 
  (-8.03)  (-5.59)  (-8.52)  (-5.97)  (-7.48) 
Hourly wage  0,204  0,052  0,160  0,036  0,220 
  (5.55)  (1.43)  (4.38)  (1.02)  (4.51) 
Presence of monetary incentives  0,098  0,092  0,108  0,014  0,046 
  (2.50)  (2.47)  (2.62)  (0.48)  (1.35) 
Amount of monetary incentives  0,074  0,016  0,068  0,008  0,050 
  (2.00)  (0.43)  (1.81)  (0.24)  (1.41) 
Relations with clients  -0,102  -0,122  -0,120  -0,002  -0,054 
  (-2.79)  (-3.31)  (-3.32)  (-0.04)  (-1.53) 
Coordination  0,080  -0,008  0,058  0,052  0,058 
  (2.34)  (-0.28)  (1.68)  (1.68)  (1.81) 
Manual worker  -0,018  0,042  0,010  0,022  0,102 
  (-0.50)  (1.14)  (0.29)  (0.57)  (2.89) 
Log Dimension (no. of Employees)  -0,100  -0,024  -0,078  0,000  -0,134 
  (-2.59)  (-0.64)  (-2.07)  (-0.01)  (-3.69) 
Central Italy  -0,040  -0,130  -0,084  -0,070  -0,056 
  (-1.15)  (-3.71)  (-2.39)  (-1.90)  (-1.61) 
Southern Italy  0,234  0,060  0,190  0,122  0,240 
  (6.25)  (1.61)  (4.96)  (3.45)  (6.75) 
Constant  -0,002  -0,002  -0,002  0,000  -0,004 
   (-0.12)  (-0.18)  (-0.14)  (0.00)  (-0.23) 
*Coefficients in bold statistically significant at least at the 5% level. 
Model1: Number of obs= 4105; F(52, 4052)= 7.23; Prob > F =  0.0000; R-squared=  0.0815; Root 
MSE= .48217 
Model2: Number of obs= 4105; F(52, 4052)= 6.52; Prob > F=  0.0000; R-squared =  0.0710; Root 
MSE= .48521 
Model3: Number of obs = 4105; F(52, 4052)= 6.99; Prob > F =  0.0000; R-squared = 0.0796; Root 
MSE= .48324 
Model4: Number of obs = 4105; F(58, 4052)= 6.74; Prob > F= 0.0000; R-squared= 0.0832; Root MSE= 
.48534 




The dimension of the firms shows a general negative relation with satisfaction. Given 
the  measurement  of  dimension  in  terms  of  logarithm  of  the  numbers  of  workers 
employed, this evidence amounts to a non-linear relation in which small organizations 
are characterized by a higher degree of satisfaction. Finally, we consider the territorial 
dummies of central and southern Italy, taking as a benchmark the biggest and most 
populated  part  of  the  country,  i.e.  northern  Italy.  We  observe  that  workers  in 
Southern Italy are more satisfied than in the rest of the country, while the opposite is 
true in the case of central Italy. The strong positive effect in the South, as we shall 




The second model introduces an active role for motivations in influencing worker well-
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Where the added terms RMi
C and 
____
ik RM represent respectively the vectors of the Rasch 
variables  concerning  motivations  at  the  individual  level  (individual  deviations  from 
organizational averages) and at the organizational level (organizational deviation from 
overall  means).  The  motivational  drivers  of  worker  behaviour  are  introduced  to 
highlight the connections between motivations and well-being which, in past studies, 
have  already  been  recorded  to  be  strong  (Borzaga  and  Depedri,  2005),  but  not 
necessarily with a positive sign. Our findings confirm past results. Workers that show 
stronger  intrinsic,  altruistic,  and  relational  motivations  enjoy  also  a  higher  level  of 
well-being.
23  The  impact  of  intrinsic  motivations  on  the  intrinsic  component  of 
satisfaction is twice as big as the impact of intrinsic motivations on the extrinsic 
component of satisfaction. Hence, the effect of motivations is strongest on the ability 
of  workers  to  reach  self -realization  and  professional  growth.  Also,  overall  job 
satisfaction is greatly enhanced by the presence of proper motivational drives, which, 
however, in this case are more important in terms of othe r regarding and relational 
motivations.  The  same  effects  are  found  when  the  organizational  average  is 
considered.  In  general,  also  the  average  strength  of  intrinsic  motivations  at  the 
organizational level appears to enhance individual well -being, though the effect is 
weaker than in the case of individual motivations.  
 
 
                                                 
22   In turn, the higher perception of fairness may be linked to the much higher level of 
unemployment that characterizes the South relative to the other part of the Italian peninsula. 
23   Given the standardization of variables suggested by Gelman (2008) workers that show 
a degree of intrinsic motivation that is one standard deviation above the mean show also a 
degree of satisfaction that is 20 per cent of one standard deviation higher than workers with 
intrinsic motivation one standard deviation under the mean.  32 
 












  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff. 
  (t)  (t)  (t)  (t)  (t) 
Age  0,032  0,174  0,092  0,116  0,038 
  (0,98)  (4,96)  (2,74)  (3,41)  (1,10) 
Tenure  0,010  -0,014  -0,006  -0,064  -0,0420 
  (0,27)  (-0,33)  (-0,17)  (-1,85)  (-1,19) 
Gender  0,022  0,064  0,036  0,088  0,074 
  (0,69)  (1,97)  (1,09)  (2,67)  (2,31) 
Married with children  -0,040  -0,030  -0,040  0,0280  0,040 
  (-1,34)  (-0,96)  (-1,31)  (0,93)  (1,36) 
Secondary school  0,020  0,020  0,022  -0,012  -0,0040 
  (0,58)  (0,53)  (0,64)  (-0,35)  (-0,10) 
University degree  0,0060  -0,0440  -0,0120  -0,078  -0,138 
  (0,19)  (-1,26)  (-0,34)  (-2,10)  (-3,84) 
Open end contract  -0,0580  0,128  0,016  -0,028  -0,130 
  (-1,76)  (3,90)  (0,48)  (-0,80)  (-3,97) 
Part-time  -0,066  0,0520  -0,0280  -0,0380  0,072 
  (-2,06)  (1,58)  (-0,86)  (-1,18)  (2,19) 
Forced part-time  -0,248  -0,172  -0,250  -0,208  -0,236 
  (-7,77)  (-5,42)  (-8,31)  (-5,79)  (-7,25) 
Hourly wage  0,206  0,056  0,164  0,044  0,224 
Receive bonuses  0,08  0,080  0,090  -0,0020  0,0400 
  (2,18)  (2,17)  (2,29)  (-0,06)  (1,17) 
Amount of bonuses  0,084  0,022  0,078  0,022  0,060 
  (2,27)  (0,61)  (2,07)  (0,65)  (1,68) 
Relations with clients  -0,108  -0,130  -0,128  -0,016  -0,0520 
  (-2,97)  (-3,51)  (-3,55)  (-0,47)  (-1,47) 
Coordination  0,078  -0,0080  0,0560  0,048  0,054 
  (2,31)  (-0,30)  (1,65)  (1,61)  (1,75) 
Manual worker  -0,010  0,046  0,016  0,030  0,108 
Employees (log dim.)  -0,088  -0,016  -0,068  0,018  -0,122 
  (-2,32)  (-0,43)  (-1,81)  (0,44)  (-3,34) 
Central Italy  -0,040  -0,134  -0,086  -0,058  -0,046 
  (-1,13)  (-3,87)  (-2,48)  (-1,60)  (-1,32) 
Southern Italy  0,202  0,0300  0,158  0,090  0,216 
  (5,45)  (0,82)  (4,14)  (2,52)  (6,03) 
Extrinsic motivation  -0,152  -0,0420  -0,130  -0,158  -0,172 
  (-4,07)  (-1,29)  (-3,56)  (-4,49)  (-4,86) 
Intrinsic motivation  0,202  0,110  0,206  0,138  0,090 
  (5,08)  (2,83)  (5,14)  (3,71)  (2,49) 
Altruistic and relational 
motivation 
0,176  0,146  0,182  0,314  0,102 
  (5,32)  (4,31)  (5,37)  (9,23)  (3,06) 
Extrinsic motivation 
(average org.) 
-0,228  -0,178  -0,222  -0,246  -0,230 
  (-5,41)  (-3,60)  (-5,01)  (-5,20)  (-5,23) 
Intrinsic motivation 
(average org.)  0,178  0,202  0,208  0,120  0,048 
  (3,79)  (3,77)  (4,26)  (2,30)  (0,94) 
Altruistic motivation 
(average org.) 
0,100  0,074  0,092  0,258  0,102 
  (2,21)  (1,54)  (2,02)  (5,33)  (2,28) 
Constant  -0,0020  -0,0020  -0,0020  0,0000  -0,0020 
  (-0.08)  (-0.16)  (-0.11)  (0.04)  (-0.19) 
*Coefficients in bold statistically significant at least at the 5% level. 
Model1: Number of obs= 4105; F(58, 4046) = 8.74; Prob > F =  0.0000; R-squared= 0.1083; Root 33 
 
MSE=.47544 
Model2: Number of obs= 4105; F(58, 4046) = 7.34; Prob > F =  0.0000; R-squared= 0.0883; Root 
MSE=.48104 
Model3: Number of obs= 4105; F(58, 4046) = 8.47; Prob > F =  0.0000; R-squared= 0.1083; Root 
MSE=.47597 
Model4: Number of obs= 4105; F(58, 4046) = 8.22; Prob > F =  0.0000; R-squared= 0.0957; Root 
MSE=.47556 
Model5: Number of obs= 4105; F(58, 4046) = 8.56; Prob > F =  0.0000; R-squared= 0.1012; Root 
MSE=.47919 
 
Hence,  a  stimulating  work  environment  is  found  to  improve  well-being  for  each 
individual worker. 
 
Opposite results are found in the case of extrinsic motivations, which reduce worker 
well-being. Workers driven prevalently by the desire to obtain higher wages, career 
advancements  and  employment  protection  are  likely  to  be  frustrated  by  actual 
achievement and to report a low level of on-the-job well-being. The effect in the case 
is  stronger  for  organizational  averages  than  at  the  individual  level.  The  negative 
impact of the organizational average of extrinsic motivations has a similar magnitude 
for  all  the  components  of  satisfaction,  though  it  is  slightly  weaker  in  the  case  of 
extrinsic  satisfaction.  At  the  individual  level,  instead,  the  impact  on  intrinsic 
satisfaction is three times as big as the impact on extrinsic satisfaction.
24  
 
The introduction of motivations in regression analysis is also a way to check for the 
self-selection  of  different  kinds  of  workers  into  a  specific  typology  of  organization, 
such as social cooperatives producing social services. The specific conception of the 
work  expressed  by  each  individual  worker,  by  making  explicit  his  or  her  main 
motivational  drives,  helps  to  eliminate  the  impact  of  specific  motivations,  and 
especially of socially oriented motivations, in the production of social services. Though 
we are unable to demonstrate that the results concerning satisfaction in the social 
service sector and in mutual benefit organizations can be generalized and exported to 
other sectors of economic activity, a high degree of reliability of our results is likely to 
be  guaranteed  by  the  possibility  to  apply  the  coeteris  paribus  to  individual 
motivations.  
 
The third model leads us to the introduction of fairness concerns as determinants of 
worker  well-being.  Its  algebraic  representation  introduces  the  vectors  representing 
the individual deviations of the Rasch variables relative to the organizational mean 
(distributive fairness, quality of treatment, quality of decision-making),  i RF c, and the 
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24   Organizations in which extrinsic motivations are dominant display a level of individual 
well-being on-the-job that is 20% of one standard deviation lower than organizations that 
score one standard deviation under the mean.  
25   In  the  estimates  concerning  fairness  the  comparative  component  of  distributive 
fairness was eventually dropped because it is highly collinear with the individual component 
of distributive fairness and because its impact is never statistically significant.  34 
 
When  the  variables  representing  fairness  are  introduced,  we  confirm  the  results 
already found in past studies (Helliwell and Huang, 2005; Tortia, 2008), which identify 
in  the  search  for  fair  outcomes  and  procedures  the  most  relevant  determinant  of 
worker  well-being  inside  the  organization.
26  Conversely,  the  perception  of  unfair 
distribution of outcomes, or of unfair treatment and quality of decision-making appear 
to undermine workers‘ on-the-job well-being. Among the considered variable, good 
relations with superiors emerge as the most important determinant of worker well-
being. Their impact is strongest in the case of intrinsic satisfaction. Hence it is strictly 
linked with workers‘ achievement and self-realization. Conversely, it appears weakest 
in the case of wage satisfaction. The impact of the quality of treatment on the intrinsic 
component of satisfaction is four times as big as the impact on wage satisfaction.
27 
However, this last impact is bigger than the impact of any of the motivational items 
on any of the specifications of satisfaction. These estimates highlight the magnitude of 
the impact of the quality of relations with superiors on worker well-being. 
 
Similar results, albeit weaker, are obtained for organizational averages. The effect of 
the quality of treatment has to be compared with the effect of the quality of decision-
making, since the latter represents a more formalized and impersonal dimension of 
the procedural milieu than the former. Although they also show difference, the two 
components of fairness resemble each other because they both share a procedural 
nature, and because their impact on well-being is extremely strong. As expected, the 
impact of the organizational averages is stronger in the case of the quality of decision-
making, than in the case of the quality of treatment. The two impacts are similar at 
the organizational level, but the quality of treatment shows a much stronger impact at 
the individual level (about 50% higher for all the components of satisfaction). This 
result testimonies that the quality of decision-making is perceived by workers as a 
stable feature of the organization, at least partly independently from the interaction 
with their superiors. Distributive fairness is important as well and its coefficient shows 
a positive signs and a statistically significant impact on all the dimensions of individual 
satisfaction. As expected, the impact is strongest in the case of wage satisfaction. This 
results lends coherence to the distinction of a perspective that focuses exclusively on 
monetary  outcomes  from  a  perspective  that  considers  instead  also  processes  and 
intrinsic aspects of well-being.  
 
The  organisational  average  in  itself  shows  a  positive  impact  on  satisfaction,  albeit 
weaker than the case of the individual perceptions. Finally, the adequacy of the wage 
relative to the cost of life increases worker well-being, even if this variable is never so 
important like procedural fairness and relations with superiors. Its impact is crucial in 
the case of wage satisfaction, while it is weaker in the case of overall job satisfaction. 
Having a look at the way in which the coefficients of socio-demographic variables are 
changed by the introduction of fairness concerns, we notice, for example,  that the 
coefficient  of  Southern  Italy  turns  from  highly  significant  and  positive  to  highly 
significant and negative. On the one hand, this result confirms the strong positive bias 
in the perception of fairness in the Southern Italy. On the other hand, it is clear that 
the  impact  of  fairness  on  worker  well-being  is  so  strong  that  it  can  change  the 
                                                 
26    In Table 12 we report only the variable concerning  motivations, fairness and incentives,  while the 
coefficients of the socio-demographic variables, for reasons of space, are relegated in appendix C.  
27   Workers  perceiving  a  quality  of  treatment  that  is  one  standard  deviation  above  the  mean  are 
characterized by a degree of intrinsic satisfaction  that is 64% of one standard deviation higher than workers 
characterised by a perception of quality of treatment under the mean. 35 
 
direction of the impact of the other variables. Interestingly enough, the dummy for 
Central Italy retains its positive sign also when fairness is introduced. Hence, fairness 
interacts  strongly  only  with  the  Southern  Italy  dummy.  A  second  example  of  the 
strength  of  the  effect  of  fairness  perception  is  represented  by  part-time  contract 
imposed by the firm (Appendix B).
28 The negative impact of this variable is reduced by 
the introduction of fairness and this is clearly due to the  feeling of unfair procedures 
which accompany the imposition of part-time work. As we shall see shortly, part-time 
work  imposed  by  the  organization  shows  a  strong  negative  correlation  with  the 
utilization of various kinds of incentives, not only in monetary terms, but also in terms 
of involvement and participation. This is why the explicit introduction of the variables 
representing the incentive structure dampens the significance of imposed part -time 
work. Intuitively, it is clear that part-time workers undergo the effects of less inclusive 
governance and incentives. 
 
                                                 
28   The results concerning socio-demographic variables when fairness and incentives are enclosed in the 
estimates are found in Appendix B.  36 
 
Table 12. The effects of fairness and incentives on worker well-being 
Variables  Sod Int  Sod Est  Sod Tot  Job Sat  Wage Sat  Sod Int  Sod Est  Sod Tot  Job Sat  Wage Sat 
  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff. 
   (t)  (t)  (t)  (t)  (t)  (t)  (t)  (t)  (t)  (t) 
Extrinsic motivation  -0,078  0,016  -0,054  -0,100  -0,076  -0,054  0,020  -0,036  -0,094  -0,070 
  (-2,62)  (0,48)  (-1,85)  (-3,19)  (-2,67)  (-2,01)  (0,63)  (-1,33)  (-2,94)  (-2,47) 
Intrinsic motivation  0,096  0,028  0,102  0,052  0,026  0,082  0,032  0,092  0,052  0,018 
  (3,24)  (0,86)  (3,38)  (1,60)  (0,90)  (3,01)  (0,96)  (3,24)  (1,57)  (0,64) 
Altruistic motivation  0,026  0,036  0,036  0,198  0,058  0,032  0,038  0,040  0,196  0,062 
  (1,05)  (1,19)  (1,35)  (6,40)  (2,11)  (1,33)  (1,28)  (1,59)  (6,40)  (2,29) 
Extrinsic motivation (average org.)  -0,066  -0,052  -0,056  -0,162  -0,092  -0,066  -0,066  -0,058  -0,168  -0,092 
  (-1,90)  (-1,08)  (-1,47)  (-3,57)  (-2,54)  (-1,94)  (-1,37)  (-1,55)  (-3,68)  (-2,49) 
Intrinsic motivation (average org.)  0,068  0,126  0,102  0,066  0,026  0,042  0,140  0,088  0,070  0,010 
  (1,80)  (2,49)  (2,53)  (1,32)  (0,62)  (1,17)  (2,77)  (2,20)  (1,37)  (0,23) 
Altruistic motivation (average org.)  -0,030  -0,012  -0,032  0,188  0,082  -0,016  -0,014  -0,024  0,192  0,094 
  (-0,81)  (-0,26)  (-0,83)  (4,29)  (2,13)  (-0,46)  (-0,31)  (-0,66)  (4,32)  (2,40) 
Distributive fairness  0,158  0,182  0,186  0,182  0,610  0,132  0,178  0,166  0,174  0,600 
  (5,65)  (5,83)  (6,77)  (5,52)  (21,04)  (4,94)  (5,72)  (6,18)  (5,31)  (20,50) 
Procedural fairness  0,502  0,398  0,500  0,422  0,150  0,352  0,328  0,368  0,358  0,118 
  (16,24)  (11,43)  (16,41)  (11,78)  (4,87)  (11,92)  (9,27)  (12,23)  (9,83)  (3,68) 
Relationships with superiors  0,642  0,438  0,622  0,444  0,188  0,506  0,360  0,496  0,368  0,168 
  (23,03)  (12,87)  (21,50)  (14,01)  (6,42)  (18,78)  (10,46)  (17,61)  (11,30)  (5,55) 
Distributive fairness (average org.)  0,082  0,148  0,130  0,050  0,480  0,084  0,150  0,130  0,056  0,472 
  (2,41)  (3,91)  (3,91)  (1,31)  (13,47)  (2,60)  (4,02)  (4,08)  (1,42)  (13,1) 
Procedural fairness (average org.)  0,408  0,356  0,416  0,248  0,056  0,326  0,316  0,344  0,208  0,042 
  (9,70)  (7,02)  (10,07)  (5,36)  (1,28)  (8,08)  (6,29)  (8,60)  (4,47)  (0,95) 
Relationships with superiors (av. org.)  0,330  0,172  0,302  0,140  0,092  0,206  0,116  0,192  0,088  0,074 
  (9,47)  (4,21)  (8,63)  (3,35)  (2,47)  (6,05)  (2,84)  (5,55)  (2,11)  (1,95) 
Cost of life  0,228  0,142  0,246  0,086  0,506  0,174  0,128  0,202  0,072  0,496 
  (8,05)  (4,30)  (8,14)  (2,91)  (15,89)  (6,43)  (3,82)  (6,90)  (2,44)  (15,48) 
Professional growth            0,214  0,006  0,144  0,142  -0,024 
            (9,89)  (0,21)  (6,71)  (4,77)  (-0,91) 
Autonomy in work organisation            0,274  0,188  0,268  0,164  0,080 
            (10,11)  (5,59)  (9,64)  (4,73)  (2,56) 
Autonomy in problem solving            0,094  0,008  0,056  -0,008  -0,012 
            (3,52)  (0,25)  (1,97)  (-0,21)  (-0,39) 
Job stability            0,104  0,266  0,176  0,152  0,004 
            (4,16)  (8,89)  (6,93)  (4,62)  (0,17) 
Use of monetary incentives            0,040  -0,032  0,026  -0,012  0,064 
            (1,47)  (-0,90)  (0,85)  (-0,36)  (2,19) 
Participation in the mission            0,156  -0,004  0,102  0,028  0,050 37 
 
            (5,16)  (-0,10)  (3,46)  (0,67)  (1,32) 
Participation in decision-making            0,288  0,020  0,212  0,058  0,038 
            (8,82)  (0,45)  (6,58)  (1,37)  (1,02) 
Constant  0,000  -0,002  0,000  0,000  -0,002  0,000  -0,002  -0,002  0,002  -0,004 
   (-0,05)  (-0,13)  (-0,07)  (0,07)  (-0,16)  (-0,09)  (-0,21)  (-0,17)  (0,10)  (-0,33) 
Model1: Number of obs=; F(65, 4039) = 44.75; Prob > F =  0.0000; R-squared= 0.4799; Root MSE=.36341 
Model2: Number of obs=; F(65, 4039) = 28.29; Prob > F =  0.0000; R-squared= 0.2995; Root MSE=.42204 
Model3: Number of obs=; F(65, 4039) = 42.20; Prob > F =  0.0000; R-squared= 0.4806; Root MSE=.36358 
Model4: Number of obs=; F(65, 4039) = 35.27; Prob > F =  0.0000; R-squared= 0.4118; Root MSE=.37225 
Model5: Number of obs=; F(65, 4039) = 41.18; Prob > F =  0.0000; R-squared= 0.4658; Root MSE=.39154 
Model6: Number of obs=; F(72, 4004) = 58.17; Prob > F =  0.0000; R-squared= 0.5605; Root MSE=.33436 
Model7: Number of obs=; F(72, 4004) = 28.07; Prob > F =  0.0000; R-squared= 0.3201; Root MSE=.41559 
Model8: Number of obs=; F(72, 4004) = 47.85; Prob > F =  0.0000; R-squared= 0.5353; Root MSE=.34347 
Model9: Number of obs=; F(72, 4004) = 36.52; Prob > F =  0.0000; R-squared= 0.4526; Root MSE=.35816 




The last model introduces explicitly the variables representing the incentive structure. 










Where  Ii  is  the  vector  of  variables  representing  the  incentives  offered  by  the 
organization to boost the alignment between worker motivation and firm objectives, 
and improved worker performance. The coefficients and t statistics displayed in Table 
12 make clear that the incentive structure of the organization has a strong impact on 
worker well-being mainly in its intrinsic component. Autonomy in the organization of 
the  work  and  professional  growth  appear  to  exert  the  most  relevant  impact  on 
satisfaction  with  achievement  on  the  work  and  self-realization.  The  same  is  true, 
though to a lesser extent, for participation in decision-making and in the mission of 
the organization. The impact of the former two variables appears to be twice as big as 
the  impact  of  the  latter  couple  of  variables.  Participation  in  the  mission  of  the 
organization and in decision-making exerts a strong influence on well-being as well, 
but only on its intrinsic component. The latter variable shows a stronger impact then 
the  former,  and  its  effect  is  similar  in  magnitude  to  the  one  of  autonomy  and 
professional  growth.  Hence,  it  appears  the  importance  of  worker  participation 
advocated  by  many  studies  is  not  misplaced,  when  it  is  properly  aligned  with  the 
pursuit of organizational objectives. Job stability, together with employment,  is the 
feature of the job that influences in the most consistent way all the components of 
satisfaction, with the exception of wage satisfaction. However, contrary to autonomy 
and  participation,  job  stability  influences  the  extrinsic  more  than  the  intrinsic 
component  of  satisfaction.  It  appears  to  be  a  crucial  feature  of  the  contractual 
relation, since it reduces the risks of unemployment, empowers workers‘ expectations 
and motivations within the organization, and lengthens workers‘ temporal horizon in 
terms of professional growth.  
 
3.2. Issues of endogeneity 
 
We  are  aware  of  the  potentially  serious  problems  arising  from  endogeneity,  i.e. 
correlation of the regressors with the error term. Endogeneity problems are likely to 
be  related  to  both  the  presence  of  omitted  variables,  self-selection  and  inverse 
causality.  For  example,  when  the  source  of  endogeneity  is  represented  by  inverse 
causality, more satisfied workers may be able to reach a higher degree of on-the-job 
autonomy, or to accomplish better professional growth, since they are more likely to 
get involved in the activity of the firm and to align their objectives with those of the 
firm.  In  this  sense,  incentives  might  be  understood  as  final  outcomes  of  the 
interaction between the worker and the structure, not as the determinants of worker 
well-being. The same argument applies to the relations between workers and their 
superiors (quality of treatment). More satisfied workers are likely to accomplish better 
relations  with  their  superiors.  If  this  is  true  then  the  bidirectional  causal  effects 
between  satisfaction  and  individual  worker  position  can  generate  inconsistent 
estimators in the OLS framework. It is also clear that there can be inverse causality 
between satisfaction and monetary outcomes. More motivated and satisfied workers 
are  likely  to  obtain  higher  salaries  and  monetary  incentives.  Hence  again,  OLS 
estimates  are  likely  to  be  inconsistent.  Also  the  ubiquitous  problem  of  omitted 
variables  can  engender  severe  problems  of  inverse  causality.  If  some  unobserved 
variable influences both the organizational dimension and satisfaction, the estimates 
are again likely to be inconsistent. However, the richness of the database, the long list 
of controls, and the unique availability of variables directly measured at the individual  
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level, make us confident about the substantive validity of the result. As said in the 
previous section, the problem of self-selection of specific typologies of workers in a 
specific organizational form such as the social cooperative has been addressed mainly 
by controlling for individual characteristics and motivational drivers.  
 
Though an in depth analysis of endogeneity will not be carried out, we can defend our 
work on various grounds. First, at the substantive level it is clear that worker well-
being can be taken as one of the main outcomes of the firm operation (Stiglitz, 2009) 
beside output, productivity and service quality. It is also clear that, in the interaction 
between the worker and the organizational structure, the influence of the latter on the 
behavioural  predispositions  of  the  former  cannot  be  excluded  (Hodgson,  2006). 
Indeed, it is likely to represent a conspicuous part of the observed correlations. This is 
testified  also  by  the  significance  of  the  organizational  averages  of  the  Rasch 
measurements. If a causal relation running from the organizational structure to the 
individual were absent, data within the organization would be distributed randomly, 
and the significance of the organizational averages would be much reduced. Second, 
the statistical significance of most of the discussed coefficients is so strong, that it is 
likely  to  be  found  in  conjunction  with  the  underlying  causal  effects,  even  if,  in 
principle, other omitted variables or reverse causality could change the picture in a 
relevant  way.  Third,  some  of  the  variables  that  are  central  in  our  model,  such  as 
procedural fairness, are likely to represent stable features of the organization, hence 
to  be  quite  independent  of  the  individual  interaction  between  the  worker  and  the 
organization.  Indeed,  workers  were  asked  to  evaluate  the  behaviour  of  the 
cooperative  in  terms  of  quality  of  decision-making  independently  of  their  personal 
position. Though it is still possible that the ―warm glow‖ of the organization is better 
perceived by more satisfied workers, we do not expect problems of endogeneity to be 
severe at least in the case of procedural fairness. Fourth, even when inverse causality 
is  not  excluded  like  in  the  case  of  autonomy  and  professional  growth,  the  OLS 
estimates make clear that the strongest statistical linkage is found with satisfaction in 
terms of self-realization and professional  growth. Hence, satisfaction appears to be 
more  the  outcome  than  the  determinant  of  professional  growth.  These  are  the 
theoretical  reasons  supporting  the  usefulness  of  the  presented  model  also  in  the 
presence of conspicuous risks of endogeneity bias.  
 
Other methodological hints are to be added. First, given the high complexity of the 
model, an in depth treatment of endogeneity would be extremely cumbersome and 
unmanageable within one single article. Hence, this analysis is postponed to future, 
more focalized, work. Second, we introduce a wide range of control variables, which 
should  be  able  to  reduce  as  much  as  possible  (within  the  scope  of  the  ICSI2007 
database) the presence of estimation inconsistency dependent on omitted variables. 
Third, the introduction of instrumental variable estimation is not without drawbacks. 
As it is well known,  two stages least squares estimation can deliver poorer results 
than ordinary least squares when the correlation between the endogenous variables 
and the instruments is weak and instruments themselves show a non-zero correlation 
with the residuals. Fourth, given the ad hoc nature of the ICSI 2007 database the 
search for instrumental variables that are relevant for the whole sample of micro-data 
is likely to be particularly difficult. 
 
Because of these reasons, at the present stage of our analysis, we remain with OLS 
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  Concluding remarks 
 
The present contribution has been devoted to the analysis of the interplay between 
worker well-being, worker motivations and various organizational dimensions in the 
Italian  social  service  sector.  We  took  into  consideration  one  specific  typology  of 
organizational form, the social cooperative, which is understood as a form of social 
enterprise delivering social services and characterized by a mutual benefit governance 
structure (Borzaga and Tortia 2010). We utilized the ICSI 2007 database that was 
built in an ad hoc way in order to study labour relations in social enterprises. The ICSI 
database  considers  major  individual  and  organizational  dimensions,  such  as 
motivations, satisfaction, fairness, and autonomy.  
 
Results show that worker well-being is greatly influenced by the considered individual 
and  organizational  factors.  Motivational  factors  emerge  as  preconditions  able  to 
enhance  or  dampen  individual  well-being.  However,  the  most  relevant  factors 
influencing worker well-being are identified in the interplay between the individual and 
the  organizational  dimension  and  are  linked  mainly  to  procedural  and  distributive 
fairness, but also to non-monetary incentives, such as autonomy and participation in 
decision-making.  Also,  monetary  incentives  and  the  wage,  whose  relevance  was 
denied  by  some  studies  show  a  positive  linkage  with  the  intrinsic  component  of 
satisfaction,  which  is  understood  in  terms  of  self-fulfilment  and  professional 
achievement. The richness of the ICSI database allows a comprehensive and in depth 
picture to be taken of the most important factors influencing well-being on-the-job 
and this work has represented only the first comprehensive step leading to more in 
depth and focused analyses.  
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Appendix A 
 
In this appendix we present a synthesis of the results for the construction of the measures of the quality 
of work used in the models of paragraph 4. 
 
 
Table A.1. Summary of the two step procedure for the 3 measures of the Motivations of work 
    (12 items for 3 subdimensions; GCA = 94; VAF = 58; REV = 45) 
Question: In general, how important are the following aspects of the work for you? 
Response scale: rating from 1 = ―Less important‖ to 12 = ―Most important‖. 
 
    EFA    RSM   





RA = 62; SM = 94; EV = 
63 
             
Hours  Flexibility of working hours  0.50  0.28  0.23  0.34 1.11  0.68 
Career  Self-realization and career prospects  0.56  0.22  0.02  0.15 1.07  0.68 
Wage and incentives  Wage and economic incentives  0.83  0.01  0.08  0.01 0.79  0.74 
Stability   Job stability  0.56  0.26  0.09  -0.50 1.10  0.63 
INTRINSIC MOTIVATIONS 
RA = 66; SM = 95; EV = 
62 
             
Coherence  Coherence with education and professional 
background 
0.35  0.51  0.12  0.27 1.08  0.65 
Utility  Social visibility and utility of the job  0.21  0.69  0.24  0.23 0.84  0.70 
Ambient  Physical working environment  0.39  0.61  0.18  0.12 0.97  0.67 
Autonomy  Autonomy, variety and creativity  0.38  0.50  0.13  -0.24 0.97  0.61 
Ideals  Sharing of values and ideals  0.01  0.55  0.20  -0.37 1.10  0.58 
RELATIONAL MOTIVATIONS 
RA = 48; SM = 96; EV = 
62 
             
Users    Relations outside the job (clients and 
users) 
0.05  0.12  0.73  0.33 0.82  0.80 
Others     Support disadvantaged people   0.04  0.25  0.51  -0.16 1.09  0.71 
Colleagues  Relations on-the-job  0.20  0.15  0.61  -0.17 0.95  0.73 
Quantification method: Categorical Principal Component Analysis (CatPCA) 
Extraction method: Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA; principal axis factoring of the CatPCA 
quantifications) 
Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser normalization 
Measurement method: Rasch Analysis with the Rating Scale Model (RSM) 
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Table A.2. Summary of the two step procedure for the 4 measures of the Fairness of work 
    (20 items for 4 subdimensions; GCA = 98; VAF = 74; REV = 65) 
Question for the Distributive Fairness:  Do you think that your overall pay is fair compared with… 
Response scale: 1 = ―Much less than fair‖, 2,…, 4 = ―Fair‖,…, 6, 7 = ―Much more than fair‖. 
Question for the Procedural Fairness:  How much do you agree with the following statements? 
Response scale: 1 = ―Strongly disagree‖, 2,…, 6, 7 = ―Strongly agree‖. 
Question for the Interactional Fairness:  Your supervisor or your superiors… 
Response scale: 1 = ―Definitely not‖, 2,…, 4 = ―Neither yes nor no‖,…, 6, 7 = ―Definitely yes‖. 
 
    EFA    RSM   
Measures and 
Items 
Descriptions  Factor loadings  Difficul
ty 
Infit Ptmea 
DISTRIBUTIVE FAIRNESS - INDIVIDUAL 
RA = 89; SM = 96; EV = 74 
             
Stress  Stress and tension  0,76  0,23  0,13  0,08   0.45 1.09  0.83 
Responsibility  Responsibility and role  0,83  0,21  0,14  0,08   0.18 0.80  0.86 
Effort  Effort required  0,86  0,22  0,12  0,06   0.14 0.68  0.88 
Training  Training and experience  0,70  0,27  0,16  0,07  -0.15 1.09  0.82 
Loyalty  Loyalty to the cooperative  0,65  0,36  0,12  0,08  -0.62 1.31  0.79 
DISTRIBUTIVE FAIRNESS - OTHERS 
RA = 74; SM = 62; EV = 63 
             
Wage Others  The wages of employees in other 
organizations 
0,29  0,59  0,05  0,01   0.56 1.19  0.78 
Wage Colleagues  The wages of colleagues in the 
cooperative 
0,26  0,70  0,05  0,03  -0.14 0.93  0.75 
Wage Superiors  The wages of superiors  0,22  0,79  0,08  0,09  -0.15 0.90  0.77 
Coop Resources  The economic resources of the 
cooperative 
0,25  0,69  0,12  0,10  -0.28 0.87  0.77 
PROCEDURAL 
FAIRNESS 
RA = 80; SM = 83; 
EV = 77 
               
Information  Collects complete information on 
worker activity 
0,14  0,07  0,78  0,26  0.23 0.91  0.82 
Equality  Treats its workers in the same 
manner 
0,14  0,11  0,75  0,27  0.23 1.17  0.80 
Targets  Has clear and shared goals  0,16  0,09  0,78  0,30  0.06 0.81  0.82 
Guidelines   Gives advice and guidelines  0,15  0,05  0,76  0,28  0.00 0.94  0.80 
Respect  Respect what has been promised  0,11  0,09  0,68  0,35  -0.52 1.16  0.74 
INTERACTIONAL 
FAIRNESS 
RA = 79; SM = 95; 
EV = 73 
               
Listening  Pay attention to workers‘ ideas and 
proposals 
0,01  0,08  0,22  0,79   0.43 1.02  0.81 
Advices  Give advices and guidance  0,10  0,05  0,30  0,73   0.40 1.07  0.80 
Working needs  Are sensitive to on-the-job needs  0,11  0,07  0,22  0,84   0.20 0.77  0.83 
Attention  Give adequate weight to the quality 
of results 
0,09  0,05  0,32  0,71   0.02 1.11  0.78 
Personal needs  Are sensitive to personal and family 
needs 
0,07  0,04  0,19  0,80  -0.31 1.02  0.77 
Availability  Are kind and helpful  0,02  0,05  0,22  0,76  -0.74 1.06  0.73 
Quantification method: Categorical Principal Component Analysis (CatPCA) 
Extraction method: Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA; principal axis factoring of the CatPCA 
quantifications) 
Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser normalization 
Measurement method: Rasch Analysis with the Rating Scale Model (RSM) 
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Table A.3. Summary of the two step procedure for the 2 measures of the Job Satisfaction 
    (12 items for 2 subdimensions; GCA = 93; VAF = 57; REV = 49) 
Question: How satisfied are you with... 
Response  scale:  1  =  ―Strongly  unsatisfied‖,  2,…,  4  =  ―Neither  satisfied  nor  dissatisfied‖,…,  6,  7  = 
―Strongly satisfied‖. 
 
    EFA    RSM   
Measures and Items*  Descriptions  Factor 
loadings 
Difficulty  Infit  Ptme
a 
EXTRINSIC JOB SATISFACTION 
RA = 74; SM = 94; EV = 
54 
           
Ambient  Physical work environment  0.59  0.24   0.10  0.99  0.69 
Stability  Job stability  0.59  0.20   0.05  1.12  0.68 
Hours  Working hours  0.70  0.19   0.04  0.89  0.71 
Flexibility  Flexibility of work hours  0.68  0.23  -0.05  0.95  0.69 
Security  Job and social security  0.60  0.24  -0.14  1.03  0.68 
INTRINSIC JOB SATISFACTION 
RA = 87; SM = 97; EV = 
66 
 
   
     
Career  Achieved and expected career 
prospects  0.20  0.63 
 0.98  1.09  0.72 
Involvement  Involvement in the decision-
making process  0.21  0.72 
 0.44  0.88  0.76 
Development  Professional development  0.24  0.67   0.01  0.95  0.73 
Recognition  Recognition of his/her work by 
the cooperative  0.26  0.76 
-0.20  0.90  0.77 
Transparency  Transparency of procedures  0.25  0.74  -0.31  0.99  0.75 
Realization  Self-realization  0.24  0.63  -0.37  1.11  0.70 
Autonomy  Autonomy in decision-making  0.26  0.58  -0.55  1.09  0.67 
Quantification method: Categorical Principal Component Analysis (CatPCA) 
Extraction method: Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA; principal axis factoring of the CatPCA 
quantifications) 
Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser normalization 
Measurement method: Rasch Analysis with the Rating Scale Model (RSM) 
The measurement of total satisfaction simply includes all the items in both the intrinsic and 




Appendix B. Control variables. Effects of fairness and incentives on worker well-being 
Variables  Sod Int  Sod Est  Sod Tot  Job Sat 
Wage 
Sat  Sod Int  Sod Est  Sod Tot  Job Sat 
Wage 
Sat 
  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff. 
   t  t  t  t  t  t  t  t  t  t 
Age  -0,102  0,064  -0,044  0,014  -0,036  -0,088  0,054  -0,038  0,018  -0,036 
  (-3,72)  (2,09)  (-1,63)  (0,48)  (-1,33)  (-3,40)  (1,74)  (-1,50)  (0,59)  (-1,26) 
Tenure  0,130  0,084  0,116  0,018  0,054  0,044  0,070  0,052  -0,016  0,040 
  (4,22)  (2,28)  (3,68)  (0,54)  (1,88)  (1,57)  (1,92)  (1,75)  (-0,51)  (1,38) 
Gender  -0,040  0,020  -0,020  0,040  0,096  -0,040  0,000  -0,040  0,040  0,096 
  (-1,46)  (0,90)  (-0,74)  (1,69)  (3,81)  (-2,17)  (0,07)  (-1,51)  (1,22)  (3,83) 
Married with children  -0,040  -0,020  -0,040  0,020  0,018  -0,020  -0,020  -0,020  0,040  0,016 
  (-1,54)  (-1,09)  (-1,61)  (1,00)  (0,71)  (-1,01)  (-0,87)  (-1,10)  (1,21)  (0,69) 
Secondary school  0,024  0,024  0,026  -0,008  0,002  0,014  0,018  0,016  -0,008  0,002 
  (0,89)  (0,75)  (1,00)  (-0,25)  (0,08)  (0,57)  (0,55)  (0,68)  (-0,25)  (0,05) 
University degree and higher  0,044  -0,002  0,032  -0,048  -0,050  0,000  -0,014  -0,002  -0,062  -0,060 
  (1,62)  (-0,04)  (1,17)  (-1,46)  (-1,80)  (0,03)  (-0,49)  (-0,10)  (-1,86)  (-2,14) 
Open end contract  0,032  0,198  0,110  0,032  -0,026  -0,024  0,150  0,054  -0,016  -0,024 
  (1,27)  (6,88)  (4,24)  (1,05)  (-0,94)  (-1,02)  (5,07)  (2,13)  (-0,53)  (-0,88) 
Part-time  -0,100  0,022  -0,064  -0,062  0,000  -0,066  0,014  -0,044  -0,052  0,002 
  (-4,01)  (0,79)  (-2,56)  (-2,12)  (-0,02)  (-2,82)  (0,49)  (-1,82)  (-1,79)  (0,04) 
Forced part-time  -0,110  -0,068  -0,110  -0,122  -0,132  -0,044  -0,048  -0,054  -0,100  -0,118 
  (-4,59)  (-2,40)  (-4,82)  (-3,83)  (-5,01)  (-1,92)  (-1,64)  (-2,49)  (-3,16)  (-4,48) 
Hourly wage  0,138  0,000  0,090  0,000  0,114  0,106  -0,008  0,066  -0,012  0,106 
  (5,22)  (0,01)  (3,07)  (-0,01)  (2,95)  (4,07)  (-0,20)  (2,27)  (-0,36)  (2,79) 
Presence of monetary incentives  0,086  0,082  0,096  -0,004  0,046  0,078  0,086  0,092  -0,004  0,042 
  (3,17)  (2,67)  (3,34)  (-0,17)  (1,84)  (3,15)  (2,82)  (3,42)  (-0,12)  (1,66) 
Amount of monetary incentives  0,056  -0,002  0,048  0,010  0,020  -0,006  -0,012  -0,002  -0,006  -0,004 
  (1,98)  (-0,07)  (1,63)  (0,32)  (0,72)  (-0,22)  (-0,35)  (-0,04)  (-0,18)  (-0,13) 
Relations with clients  -0,090  -0,118  -0,112  -0,006  -0,032  -0,046  -0,092  -0,070  0,008  -0,020 
  (-3,28)  (-3,64)  (-4,02)  (-0,19)  (-1,12)  (-1,82)  (-2,90)  (-2,71)  (0,28)  (-0,69) 
Coordination  0,066  -0,018  0,042  0,042  0,024  0,036  -0,026  0,020  0,032  0,018 
  (2,53)  (-0,72)  (1,67)  (1,53)  (0,97)  (1,51)  (-1,03)  (0,83)  (1,23)  (0,71) 
Manual worker  -0,066  -0,002  -0,042  -0,010  0,040  -0,030  -0,002  -0,016  -0,002  0,042 
  (-2,35)  (-0,09)  (-1,56)  (-0,29)  (1,41)  (-1,16)  (-0,04)  (-0,63)  (-0,07)  (1,48) 
Log Dimension (number of Employees  -0,024  0,054  0,008  0,054  -0,024  0,026  0,060  0,046  0,056  -0,012 
  (-0,88)  (1,60)  (0,27)  (1,51)  (-0,79)  (1,02)  (1,80)  (1,74)  (1,55)  (-0,42) 
Central Italy  -0,088  -0,180  -0,136  -0,092  -0,040  -0,060  -0,166  -0,110  -0,078  -0,038 
  (-3,26)  (-5,84)  (-5,16)  (-2,82)  (-1,44)  (-2,38)  (-5,47)  (-4,43)  (-2,46)  (-1,31) 
Southern Italy  -0,064  -0,200  -0,122  -0,060  0,006  -0,076  -0,186  -0,128  -0,048  -0,004 
  (-2,12)  (-5,60)  (-3,89)  (-1,71)  (0,18)  (-2,68)  (-5,28)  (-4,25)  (-1,35)  (-0,15) 
*Coefficients in bold statistically significant at least at the 5% level. 
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